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Over the past two decades, a combination of social movement activists,
academics, and developing countries have mounted a formidable critique of
international organizations like the World Trade Organization. The bill of
particulars is by now familiar to most observers: the neo-liberal formula of open
markets, export-oriented economic growth, low budget deficits, minimal state
intervention in the economy, deregulation, and privatization proved a disaster
for most of the developing countries to which it was applied.1 The damage,
while particularly acute in the developing world, was not limited to that realm.
The critics have argued that even democracies in the western world have
suffered at the hands of international organizations. Allegedly, such
organizations sacrificed domestic concern for social and economic inequalities
and environmental protection to the false regulatory imperatives of the global
market.
The critique has been accompanied by a call for greater involvement,
within international organizations, of civil society.2 For some, civil society means
all associations between the state and the market. For the most disapproving
voices, however, civil society includes only social and environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that strive to improve material conditions
for the world's poor and protect the environment, not groups of firms and other
market participants that seek to advance the economic interests of their
members. The remedy is to curb the broad powers exercised by national
ministers, international bureaucrats, and multinational corporations with the
right of civil society to participate in and directly influence the decisionmaking of
global institutions.
Advocates of civil society participation have already triggered a series of
reforms of international organizations. A number of other reforms have not yet
been adopted but are being promoted, vigorously, by academics and activists
alike. Yet the justification for such far-reaching change, apart from the impulse
to replace the present, state-centered configuration of international organizations
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with something different, is unclear. Why are associations outside the state
better placed than trained, career civil servants and elected politicians to decide
on foreign aid, regulatory pre-requisites for free trade, measures necessary to
protect the environment, and other, pressing issues of global governance? And
even though we might all agree that associations outside the state have
something to contribute to the work of civil servants and elected politicians,
what, precisely, should be their role? If the principal contribution of non-state
associations is rallying the citizens of the world on international issues so citizens
may hold their governments accountable, the decisions of international
organizations simply need to be visible to such associations and those whom
they seek to mobilize. In other words, all that is needed is greater transparency.
But maybe--as most activists argue--non-state associations should also have
certain, express rights to participate in the day-to-day decisions of international
lawmaking bodies, bureaucracies, and tribunals. This Article seeks to fill the
theoretical lacuna by advancing a normative framework for understanding
whether, and how, to redesign global institutions to include civil society.
This analysis of how civil society can contribute to a better system of
global governance draws on the political philosophy of civil society and the
comparative law of democracy. Its first part describes the civil society
phenomenon in three different international organizations: the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization, and the European Union. Part Two puts forward the
moral principle upon which my argument rests: liberal democracy. The next
part sets the stage for the discussion of contemporary liberal theories of civil
society by reviewing the history of the concept. Part Four critically examines the
four dominant theories of citizen associations and their contribution to the good
life in democratic societies. These theories serve as the basis for evaluating the
pro-civil society reforms that have been made to date in international
organizations and for suggesting additional areas of improvement. Yet the
review of the literature also demonstrates, somewhat surprisingly, that the
political philosophers and the civil society activists are talking past one another:
the theory does not address head-on the question whether associations should be
represented in public decisionmaking. For civil society theory, the
democratizing potential of civil society lies in collective life outside the state.
Thus, Part Five explores the comparative law of contemporary democracies and
shows that interest and identity groups can participate in public life in at least
three different ways: pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism. The
concluding section returns to the institutional reform of international
organizations. In view of the premises and ideals that inform different cultures
of democracy and the realities of politics in the international realm, I argue that
the public law of corporatism is the most appropriate for today's international
organizations.
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Reform of International Organizations
This section canvasses some of the recent initiatives designed to include
civil society--defined as all interest and identity associations outside the state--in
the governance activities of international organizations.3 The purpose is not to
provide an exhaustive description but rather to bring to light the scope of the
civil society phenomenon and the importance of developing a theoretical
framework that can assist in evaluating current and future institutional reform
efforts.
The World Bank
Among international organizations, and particularly among international
financial institutions, the World Bank is widely regarded as having made some
of the most far-reaching reforms to accommodate civil society.4 Its efforts have
extended to the policymaking, program implementation, and implementationreview functions of the Bank. Since the mid-1990s, the Bank has issued a number
of policy statements promising greater NGO participation in loan decisions.5 For
example, when the Bank issues a loan for a specific development project such as
a dam, it requires that the recipient government consult with local residents and
NGOs to design relocation plans and environmental preservation measures.6
While such loan conditions do not bring civil society directly into the Bank’s
decision-making process, their impact on national governments and local NGOs
can be significant.
In addition to project-specific instruments, the Bank issues structural
adjustment loans that are linked to the adoption of such political economy
measures as exchange rate stability, low inflation, and privatization of stateowned sectors of the economy. In 1997, the Bank organized a major consultation

3 This is a working definition for purposes of this Article. However, international organizations,
governments, activists, and, as we shall see, political theorists, all define the term "civil society"
slightly differently. While the World Trade Organization and the European Union adopt the broad
definition used here, the World Bank's definition is narrower: the Bank excludes associations
whose agendas are informed by the market-related activities of their members. According to the
Bank's website, civil society “[refers] to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for profit
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic
considerations.” See
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK%3A20101499~menu
PK%3A244752~pagePK%3A220503~piPK%3A220476~theSitePK%3A228717,00.html.
4 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note__ at 134; Kumi Naidoo, Civil society, governance and
globalisation: The World Bank and civil society, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 173, 179 (2003).
5 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note__ at 129-30 (discussing World Bank Development Reports of
the 1990s and World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework).
6 See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 399, 404 (2001).
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exercise with governments and civil society organizations to evaluate the impact
of adjustment lending and policy advice in seven recipient countries (Ghana,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, El Salvador, Bangladesh and Hungary). The fiveyear exercise, called the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative
(SAPRI), was conceived both as a vehicle for studying the effect of these loans on
a number of welfare indices, such as poverty rates, productive capacity, and
basic rights, and as a general examination of “how the participation of local,
broad-based civil society can improve economic policymaking.”7 However, after
the Bank published its findings in July 2001, the NGOs involved in SAPRI issued
their own, overwhelmingly negative report in April 2002, criticizing both the
overall effect of structural adjustment loans on developing countries and the
adequacy of the Bank’s efforts to address the concerns raised by civil society.8
Despite the attempts to resolve the dispute, the Bank-sponsored process
collapsed.9
The Bank’s most recent efforts to involve civil society in policymaking
have centered on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Developed in
collaboration with the IMF and domestic stakeholders, these papers present an
overview of the economic policies, development programs, and external
financing needs of specific countries, with the goal of generating a
comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction.10 PRSPs aim “to
provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the
development outcomes.”11 They are drafted through the joint effort of
government officials, local World Bank officials, private sector actors, and
NGOs.12 Despite its praiseworthy objectives, the initiative has invited the
criticism of some civil society organizations.13 These point to instances in which
governments either failed to consult NGOs, consulted them at the end of the
drafting process when few changes could be made, or allowed only NGOs
known to be sympathetic to the government's views to participate in the drafting
process. Nevertheless, even the critics acknowledge that PRSPs represent a
dramatic change from the earlier practice of deciding loan terms in exclusive,
bilateral talks between the World Bank and recipient governments.

7 SAPRI, Project Description of the SAPRI, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/saprdescnew.htm.
8 SAPRIN, THE POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY (2002), available at
www.saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf.
9 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note __ at 144; see also SAPRIN, Letter from SAPRIN Global Steering
Committee to President Wolfensohn (April 10, 2004), available at
http://www.saprin.org/SAPRIN_Wolfensohn_16April04.PDF.
10 See IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Naidoo, Civil society, governance and globalisation, supra note__ at 180.
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Mirroring civil society's role in loan decisions, NGO participation is
contemplated in reviewing project-specific loans after their implementation.14 In
1994, the Bank created an Inspection Panel to investigate complaints that Bank
officials had infringed their own procedures and rules. The multi-national,
three-member Panel is appointed by the Board of Governors (composed of
representatives of the member states) after consultation with the Executive
Directors of the Bank (the principal governing body responsible for the day-today activities of the Bank) and civil society. 15 Each member serves a single fiveyear term. More significant than the duty of civil society consultation, is the
right of local NGOs to represent individuals who stood to benefit from the
project and suffered injury as a consequence of the alleged violation of Bank
policies. While the drafters of the Inspection Panel agreement believed that
aggrieved individuals should be represented by local groups, if possible, they
also stipulated that, in the absence of such groups, international NGOs could be
authorized by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors to bring complaints.
In addition to these opportunities for civil society participation in Bank
policymaking, the Bank seeks to foster civil society in developing countries by
giving small grants to local NGOs. The Small Grants Program, managed locally
by the Bank’s country offices, is aimed at “promoting dialogue, disseminating
information for the empowerment of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and
… enhancing partnerships with key players in support of the development
process.”16 The Program distributes seed money for initiatives in areas such as
the environment, micro-credit, post-conflict reconstruction, information
technology, human rights, gender equality, and small-enterprise development.17
The Bank also funds the Development Marketplace Program, designed to create
a “marketplace of ideas” for development, in which social entrepreneurs develop
and “sell” development and poverty reduction strategies to program
administrators.18
The World Bank's commitment to civil society participation is also
reflected in certain organizational innovations. In 2002, the Bank established a
multi-tier system of Civil Society Engagement Teams. In the Bank's country
offices, Civil Society Staff (CSS) are charged with encouraging civil society
participation in programs funded by the Bank’s trust funds.19 At the Bank’s
See Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society, supra note__ at 405.
See IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE 89-90 (2000).
16 See World Bank, Small Grants Program, available at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/64ByDocName/SmallGrants.
17 Id.
18 See World Bank, Development Marketplace, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/OPPORTUNITIES/GRANTS/DEVMARKETPLAC
E/0,,menuPK:180652~pagePK:180657~piPK:180651~theSitePK:205098,00.html.
19 See World Bank, World Bank Staff Working With Civil Society, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093777~menuPK:2
20425~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html.
14
15
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headquarters, the staff in the Civil Society Group (CSG) advise the officials in
charge of particular geographic regions, loan types, and constituencies as to the
best regional strategies for involving civil society organizations.20 To coordinate
initiatives at the global level, the Bank maintains a Civil Society Team (CST),
comprised of staff from the Bank's External Affairs and Social Development
Departments.21
A number of activists have proposed additional reforms that, in their
view, would render the Bank more democratic. For instance, some have
suggested increasing the representation of developing countries among the
Bank’s Executive Directors, since under the present system representation is tied
to the size of a nation’s economy. A number of critics have also called for greater
access to information for civil society actors, and have advocated more robust
oversight of international financial institutions by national legislatures. The
Catholic development partnership CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis, for example,
argues that organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund
should become more transparent by making the transcripts and
minutes of board meetings available to the public and by
establishing sub-boards that would monitor decisions made by
the staff of the Fund and Bank. Furthermore, real democratic
control over the Fund and the Bank activities is necessary through
parliamentary control. Their orientations and policies should be
debated in the Parliament of each member state, as currently
happens in some countries.22
According to non-state actors, improvements must continue to be made if the
Bank is to be considered legitimate by citizens in donor and developing
countries. As the Secretary General of the World Alliance for Citizen
Participation (CIVICUS), Kumi Naidoo, said in his address to the World Bank in
February 2003,
[i]n order to become 'an accountable institution that is essential to
poverty reduction,' as President Wolfensohn has rightly
advocated, the Bank needs to be willing to bring its own
decisionmaking processes into line with those it is encouraging its
clients [recipient countries] to use. . . . Our vision should be of a
world where citizens and the groups they chooses to organise are
regarded as legitimate stakeholders, not only by the public,

See id.
See id.
22 CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis, Time to reform: The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 60
Years After 5 (September 2004).
20
21
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among whom they already enjoy high levels of trust, but by
governance institutions who value engagement and recognize the
many benefits it brings.23

The World Trade Organization
The WTO has adopted a number of transparency reforms, but it has been
more reluctant to improve the opportunities for direct participation of interest
and identity groups in decisionmaking.24 The Marrakesh Agreement, signed in
1994, anticipated the consultation of NGOs while leaving the details to the
General Council:
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental
organizations concerned with matters related to those of the
WTO.25
Shortly thereafter, the General Council adopted guidelines pledging to make
more WTO documents available to the public and to establish an electronic, online data base for the consultation of such documents.26 The guidelines also
urged the WTO Secretariat to hold periodic symposia with NGOs and to make
informal arrangements to ensure that NGOs would be able to pass on
information to national delegations. The General Council, however, declined to
take any further steps to promote direct participation:
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO, which
is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and
obligations among its Members and a forum for negotiations. As
a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held
view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer
consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met
See Naidoo, supra note__181-82.
The WTO defines "civil society" more broadly than does the World Bank: "Environmental
groups, organised labour, commercial farmers and various other business lobby groups in fact all
qualify for NGO status as long as they prove an interest in trade-related issues. According to one
WTO official, 'Microsoft would not be allowed to attend but its industry group would be.'"
Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO, supra note__ at 136.
25 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. V, 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1146 (1994).
26 Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, Guidelines for arrangements on relations
with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, 23 July 1996; see also Decision adopted by the
General Council on 14 May 2002, Procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents,
WT/L/452, 16 May 2002 (deciding that all WTO official documents should be unrestricted and
available to the public through WTO website).
23
24
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constructively through appropriate processes at the national level
where lies primary reponsibility for taking into account the
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on
trade policy-making.27
Today, WTO documents, including documents from Ministerials, General
Council meetings, dispute resolution proceedings, and the numerous specialized
committees that deal with individual trade agreements and policy areas, have
become widely available.28 The changes in favor of associational participation
are more limited, compared to both the transparency innovations and to the
World Bank’s civil society policies. NGOs may send representatives to
Ministerial Conferences, where they are provided with meeting rooms and are
regularly debriefed by the WTO Secretariat on the progress of the informal
working sessions of the Member States, as well as the agreements ultimately
reached.29 Before they may attend Ministerials, NGOs must be accredited by the
WTO Secretariat, but the criteria are not particularly demanding; the Secretariat
has granted about 98% of all applications to date.30 The number of accredited
NGOs has grown exponentially since the practice first began--from 156
organizations in 1996 for the Singapore Ministerial Conference to 966 in 2003 for
the Cancún Ministerial.31
NGOs, like other members of the public, may also file amicus briefs in
WTO dispute resolution proceedings. This has been allowed since 1998, when
the Appellate Body first accepted a number of amicus briefs in a case reviewing a
U.S. prohibition on shrimp imported from Malaysia motivated by environmental
concerns ("Shrimp-Turtle" case).32 The panels and the Appellate Body, however,
retain complete discretion in allowing amici to file briefs and, of course, in
allowing the views of amici to influence the outcome of cases.33
A number of scholars have proposed additional, pro-civil society reforms.
To improve attention to environmental issues in the WTO, Dan Esty
Id. at para. VI.
See Mark Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO: history, nature and implications for
developing countries, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 132, 134 (2003).
29 World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-governmental Organizations/Civil Society, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm.
30 See Mattner, supra note__ at 135. As specified in the Marrakesh Agreement, NGOs must
demonstrate to the Secretariat that their work is related to WTO activities.
31 World Trade Organization, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm.
32 See Appellate Body, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
para. 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also Appellate Body, United States--Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating
in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) (holding that Appellate Body will accept
and consider amicus briefs when "we find it pertinent and useful to do so").
33 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Civil Society at the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
275, 277-80 (2001).
27
28
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recommends establishing a new advisory committee on the environment, on
which business, labor, consumer, and environmental groups would sit. Esty
also suggests that environmental and other groups should have the right to
participate in the meetings of the WTO's Committee on Trade and the
Environment, which is charged with exploring different ways of designing a
common global set of trading rules that both protect the environment and
promote commerce among nations. 34 He would give NGOs observer status at all
formal sessions of the WTO's General Council and other governing bodies.
Finally, Esty argues that dispute resolution proceedings should be redesigned to
afford NGOs a greater role: organizations with an interest in a particular trade
dispute should have a right to submit statements to the dispute settlement panel
and panels should call upon NGOs with expertise on the scientific issues
underlying national environmental rules to participate in proceedings
challenging such rules.35
Steve Charnovitz advocates a similar set of reforms.36 As a first step, he
argues that the Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on
Trade Environment--committees that study rather than negotiate and decide
matters--should allow NGOs to participate in their work. A consultative body
composed of NGO representatives could be established and given the right to
issue opinions on decisions taken by other WTO bodies. Charnovitz also
endorses holding public hearings at which NGO representatives could appear.
In sum, there is no shortage of ideas for improving civil society participation in
the WTO.
The European Union
It might appear odd to speak of the role of civil society in the European
Union in the same breath as that in the World Bank and the WTO. The
European Union is far more than a treaty and an international organization;
indeed, many would argue that it is a quasi-federal political system. Yet the
European Union has faced the same criticism, even harsher at times, as
international economic organizations and has come forward with a similar,
though more far-reaching civil society response, as the World Bank and the
WTO.
The Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which contained an
ambitious new set of commitments to monetary union, a common foreign policy,
and cooperation on immigration and police matters, was a watershed moment
for the European Union.37 In their referendum of 1992, the Danes rejected the
Maastricht Treaty, followed by an extremely narrow "yes" vote in the French
Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs, 5 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS
267 (1999).
35 Id. at 275-76.
36 See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 299, 343-44 (2002).
37 See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (3d ed. 2003)
34
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referendum and widespread public debate in the United Kingdom and
Germany. The Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified, but this popular
skepticism had the effect of triggering serious reflection on the normative and
political underpinnings of European integration for the first time since the early
1950s. Some objections to the Treaty were fairly remote from the global
governance debate: the European Union had assumed many of the powers
traditionally reserved to nation states, yet it did not possess the institutions
typical of a democracy, nor did it enjoy the essential premise of a democracy-government identified with a group of individuals who recognize they share
enough attributes and principles to constitute a single, deliberating, and
consenting "people."38 Other objections to the Treaty tracked the critique of
international economic organizations mounted by the anti-globalization
movement: the mission set for the European Community in 1957 was the creation
of a common market--the free movement of goods, workers, services, and capital
between the Member States-- and this strangely unbalanced, liberal economic
agenda had the effect of burdening social welfare, environmental protection, and
other policies pursued at the national level.
Since 1992, the European Union's institutions have undergone radical
change, including additional, far-reaching powers for the European Parliament
and significant, new transparency and access to documents standards.39 New
channels for civil society participation have also been added. The principal one
is the European Commission’s duty to consult civil society—defined as trade
unions, employer federations, consumer organizations, environmental
organizations, human rights organizations, charitable organizations, communitybased organizations, and religious organizations—on proposals for European
legislation.40 These are the steps: The Commission describes the issues open for
discussion, the public is invited to submit written comments, and the civil society
responses are published.41 This process is to take place largely through the
Commission's website. Then, when the Commission issues the final legislative
proposal, which is transmitted to the other European lawmaking bodies for a
decision, the Commission summarizes the comments and explains how the final
proposal was or was not altered by the civil society responses.42 In 2003, the first
year after the procedure came into force, the Commission held a total of twenty-

See J.H.H WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 337 (1999).
39 See Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. (forthcoming 2005).
40 See Communication from the Commission, Toward a reinforced culture of consultation and
dialogue—General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the
Commission, COM (2002) 704 final, December 11, 2002, at 6.
41 Id. at 19-22.
42 Id. at 22.
38
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one public consultations, evidence of the extent to which the new procedure has
taken root in the Commission.43
Civil society participation also figures prominently in the Constitutional
Treaty, signed in fall 2004 by European Heads of State and to be ratified within
the next two years. Under Article I-47, all European institutions, not just the
Commission, would have to allow civil society to participate in their government
activities:
Article I-47: The principle of participatory democracy
1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and
representative associations the opportunity to make known and
publicly exchange their views on all areas of Union action.
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular
dialogue with representative associations and civil society.
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with
parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are
coherent and transparent.
After ratification, then, government bodies that traditionally have been closed to
direct pressure from citizens and their associations will have to devise new
participation procedures. These bodies include the Council of Ministers, in
which government representatives from the Member States vote on legislation,
and the European Courts, responsible for deciding cases brought against national
governments and EU institutions for breaches of European law.
The civil society idea has thus been critical in reshaping international
organizations over the past decade. But it is also an idea in flux, whose
implications have not been worked out fully in the multiple, overlapping arenas
of global governance. The time is ripe for examining the theoretical justifications
for civil society and developing a normative framework that can guide today's
global policymakers.
The Morality of Liberal Democracy
My analysis begins from the premise of liberal democracy. I employ a
standard definition: terms of cooperation to which free, equal, and rational
individuals living together in society could consent.44 Although contemporary
philosophers dispute the nature of such terms of cooperation, most would agree
that constitutional arrangements in a liberal society include, at a minimum, basic
individual rights (freedom of conscience, equal treatment, property, and other

43
44

European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 22, para. 17 (2004).
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (1993).
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liberties) and majority rule in certain domains of public life.45 The examination
below of the political philosophy and the comparative law of civil society is
limited to those thinkers and those societies that subscribe to the liberal model.
This point of departure deserves a couple words of explanation. The law
that would most naturally apply to international organizations and their
relations with civil society--international law--does not recognize liberal
democracy as a guiding principle. Over a decade ago, Thomas Franck famously
argued that a right to democratic governance was emerging in international
law.46 In making his case, he looked to the practice of nations: their consent to
international treaties and agreements; their willingness to respect the written
rules within their territories and to monitor and enforce those rules against their
nation-state neighbors; and customary international law. Yet Franck's assertion
has been contested by many scholars, who point to the continuing existence of
different regime types as evidence against an international consensus on
democracy.47 Furthermore, even if the better scholarly view is the one that
sustains an emerging right to democracy, that right would still come up short
when matched against the constitutional principles of even a minimalist form of
liberal democracy. In international law, democracy entails elections for
government officials, but without the separation of powers and the full array of
individual liberties part of the liberal tradition.48
Why, then, liberal democracy? My objective in this Article is to reflect on
the moral foundations of institutions of global governance—as opposed to the
modus vivendi of contemporary international relations. The liberal tradition in
political philosophy, complete with its moral intuitions and its arguments from
logic, offers one starting point for such an inquiry. A familiar objection is that
starting with liberalism devalues other social and political experiences--those
places in the world that Rawls categorizes as “decent peoples," "outlaw states,"
"societies burdened by unfavorable conditions" and "benevolent absolutisms."49
My response is that this Article represents but one attempt at uncovering the
right and good organizing principles of international organizations; other
attempts, based on alternative political traditions or on alternative readings of
the liberal tradition, are by no means excluded, indeed they are welcomed.
45 See Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 235,
237-44 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (comparing deliberative democracy with
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy); Jeremy Waldron, Justice, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 266, 278-79 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (discussing debate between
Nozick and Rawls).
46 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 46 (1992).
47 See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck’s
Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and World Order in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 298 (2003) (discussing debate sparked by Franck’s article).
48 See Thomas Franck, Democracy as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY 73, 75 (Louis Henkin & John Hargrove eds., 1994); Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte,
Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1995).
49 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 4 (1999).
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Moreover, this analysis is limited to one, narrow area of international relations:
the common organizations and procedures through which today’s emerging
regional and global communities are governed. The normative framework
developed below does not reach within the state to prescribe how political life is
to be ordered; it does not carry the same threat of intervention in the affairs of
sovereign nations as other universalist visions. The phenomenon of
international organizations that implicate directly the rights and duties of
individuals—often without real consent or mediation by the state parties to those
organizations—is undeniable. What are the ramifications of one political
tradition for their relations with civil society?
The History of the Civil Society Idea
Today, civil society means associational life free of the state. For most of
the life of this concept, however, it meant the exact opposite: relations among
citizens through the institutions of the state. 50 Political theorists trace the idea to
classical political philosophy, most notably, that of Aristotle.51 In the writings of
the ancients, moral perfection was attained through collective life in a political
community; all other human relations and allegiances were subsumed by that
community.
Observation tells us that every state [polis] is an association
[koinōnia] and that every association is formed with a view to
some good purpose. I say 'good', because in all their actions all
men do in fact aim at what they think is good. Clearly then, as all
associations aim at some good, that association which is most
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim
highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the
association which we call the state, the association which is
'political.' [Hē koinōnia politikē which certain contemporary
thinkers also translate as "civil society."]52
The social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
continued to use civil society to signify political life. Civil society referred to the
individual living peacefully in society with other individuals through the
constitution of legitimate political authority. In the writings of Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, individuals in the state of nature decided by social contract to
See generally NOBERTO BOBBIO, CIVIL SOCIETY, IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND
LIMITS OF STATE POWER (Peter Kennealy trans. 1989); JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999); John Keane, Despotism and Democracy The Origins and Development of the
Distinction Between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 35 (John Keane ed., 1988).
51 See, e.g., EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note__at 9.
52 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 54 (T.A. Sinclair trans. & Revised and Re-presented by Trevor J.
Saunders, Penguin Books, 1992).
50
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constitute themselves as civil society by creating a superior authority that would
govern their relations. The law set down by the superior authority would
discipline the relations among those individuals who were parties to the social
contract. The nature of political authority was very different in the thought of
the social contract theorists--absolute in Hobbes, liberal in Locke, participatory in
Rousseau--but they all agreed that political authority was the necessary, defining
element of civil society. "In this old European tradition," John Keane writes, "civil
society was coterminous with the state." 53
Civil society [ koinōnia politiké, societas civilis, société civile,
bürgerliche, Gesellschaft, Civill Society, società civile] and the state
[polis, civitas, état, Staat, state, stato] were interchangeable terms.
To be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen--a member of
the state--and thus obligated to act in accordance with its laws and
without engaging in acts harmful to other citizens.54
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, the meaning of the concept gradually
shifted to the one employed today, that is, social relations separate from the state.
The shift is associated with the rise of commerce and the growing capacity of
markets to organize and shape human relations. In the thought of David Hume,
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment,
peaceful and good relations with fellow men were possible not only through
politics but also through commerce.55 According to this line of thought, civil
society was possible both through politics and government and through the
pursuit of individual aims in economic exchange. They had reservations about
the new realm of commerce: the specialization of economic functions and the
geographically distant relations associated with the age of mercantilism could
bring about the corruption of man and the downfall of the community or
prosperity for the nation.56 Nonetheless, the sphere of peaceful and
transformative human relations expanded to included both politics and
commerce. By the time Hegel published his Philosophy of Right in 1821, the
analytic distinction between state and society was complete, and the language of
"civil society" had come to refer, almost without exception, to human relations
outside the realm of monarchy, parliaments, administration, law, courts, and the
police.57
It is important to avoid anachronisms in the telling of this brief history.
Although social and political philosophers of the nineteenth century agreed on

Keane, Despotism and Democracy, supra note__at 35-36.
Id.
55 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 44-53 (1975).
56 See id. at 470-512.
57 See BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP, supra note__ at 23.
53
54
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the distinction between state and society, they had very different theories of the
dynamics of civil society. Especially for Marx, civil society was constituted
exclusively by material relations of production. Human relations through
churches, voluntary associations, and social movements--considered the core of
today's civil society--were insignificant in the historical materialist account of the
transition from capitalism to communism and life in the communist utopia.
Choral societies, gymnastic clubs, chambers of lawyers and doctors, clubs for the
abolition of luxury clothing, and other such associations that existed in the
Germany of Marx's day were likewise irrelevant.58 Like the state, associational
life and culture were treated as products of their materialist substructure.59
Moreover, for Marx, civil society in the here-and-now was not part of the good
life. In capitalism, materialist relations of production were inherently
oppressive, and it was only after revolution and the economy's transformation
into a place where individuals could freely choose and combine pursuits--farmer,
inventor, tradesman, and intellectual--that civil society would serve as an arena
for self-expression and cooperative relations with one's fellow human beings.60
The account of civil society by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who is
still influential in contemporary European intellectual circles, was far more
variegated than that of Marx.61 Gramsci posited that the civil sphere was distinct
from the economic sphere and that this separation gave civil society a significant
degree of autonomy from the relations of production in the economic sphere.
Civil society encompassed a wide array of values, ideologies, beliefs and
voluntary associations, not just those of the dominant economic class. Hence,
even though the beliefs and ideologies of the bourgeoisie might be hegemonic,
they were subject to challenge from other cultural forces. In stark contrast to the
theories of Marx, this contention was vital to the fall of capitalism and the
disappearance of the state.
In contrast to Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville attributed significant
importance to associations outside the market. Tocqueville observed voluntary
associations of all stripes in nineteenth-century American communities. These,
he claimed in Democracy in America, were essential to the success of national and

See generally Klaus Tenfelde, Civil Society and the Middle Classes in Nineteenth-Century Germany, in
CIVIL SOCIETY BEFORE DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 83, 91 (Nancy
Bermeo & Philip Nord eds., 2000).
59 See Noberto Bobbio, Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 73, 82 (John Keane ed., 1988).
60 See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146, 197 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
61 See Bobbio, Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society, supra note__ at 88-96; Kai Nielsen,
Reconceptualizing Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings, in TOWARD A GLOBAL
CIVIL SOCIETY 41, 43 (Michael Walzer ed. 1995).
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state government: they were the "great free schools to which all citizens come to
be taught the general theory of association."62
Civil Society in Contemporary Theories of Democracy
Over the past fifteen years or so, the concept of civil society has
experienced a revival.63 It has surfaced in the analysis of government and public
life in virtually all parts of the world: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa,
Asia, Western democracies, and international regimes. Most scholars in the
social sciences and political philosophy who analyze this phenomenon argue that
associations outside the state are key to individual freedom and good
government. Without civil society, they argue, individuals are incapable of
fulfilling their essential capacities, and life with their fellow human-beings-society--is impossible or unsatisfactory. Scholars are divided, however, on what
they consider to be "liberty" and the contribution of society and government to
its pursuit. Their assessment of these fundamental questions leads to different
definitions of civil society and different prescriptions for the public policy of civil
society. This section reviews the four types of claims for how associational life
outside the state contributes to liberal democracy, claims that can be loosely
identified with four different theories of government: liberal, republican,
communitarian, and cosmopolitan.64 The purpose is three-fold: to bring to light
the reasons for giving civil society pride of place in good, global governance, to
draw out the policy implications of the theories, and to expose the shortcomings
of the existing theories in addressing today’s question of the appropriate role for
civil society in global governance.
Liberal Theory

62 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 522 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Perennial Classics 2000) (1850).
63 See MICHAEL EDWARDS, CIVIL SOCIETY 2 (2004); OMAR G. ENCARNACION, THE MYTH OF CIVIL
SOCIETY: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SPAIN AND BRAZIL 18-20 (2003); John
Keane, CIVIL SOCIETY: OLD IMAGES, NEW VISIONS 4 (1998).
64 In this section, I draw upon scholarship from around the world when examining new
democracies, but otherwise I rely heavily on empirical and normative theories developed by
American scholars. Since this paper is aimed at the global sphere, scholarly literature from old
democracies other than the United States would also be highly relevant, but it does not appear that
the vicissitudes of associational life have undergone the same empirical scrutiny or have inspired
the same theorizing in European countries and other long-standing democracies. Some European
scholars have analyzed the decline of political parties as vehicles for citizen participation in
national politics and the corresponding proliferation of issue-specific associations. See, e.g., ROGER
SUE, LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE FACE AU POUVOIR 23-25, 81-84 (2003). However, they do not focus on
associationalism outside the state, as does the theory considered in this section. Rather, Sue and
others argue for a more prominent role for voluntary associations in legislative and administrative
decisionmaking on the grounds that the new associations are more representative of citizens than
the old system of political parties and elections. Part Three takes up this argument and I postpone
my discussion of it until then.
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The liberal strand of civil society thinking is inspired by the transition
over the past three decades from dictatorship to democracy. This is what
Samuel Huntington famously called the "Third Wave" of democratization in
countries around the world: Spain and Portugal in the 1970s; Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay as well as countries in Africa and Asia in the 1980s; the countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Much empirical
analysis of new democracies makes the case that associational life outside the
state was critical in enabling democracy to take hold. In these accounts of
democratization, the collapse of dictatorship was preceded by a rise in the
number of voluntary associations, churches, social movements, and other forms
of organized social life, all subsumed under the category of "civil society." For
instance, scholars of Polish politics link the fall of the Communist government in
1989 to the proliferation of underground dissident groups, the rise of the trade
union movement "Solidarity," and the growing independence of the Catholic
Church in the 1970s and 1980s.65
The liberal justification for civil society rests on a vision of politics in
which the ability to choose freely one's life projects is critical to liberty and in
which the possibility of conflict among different life projects is healthy, not cause
for concern.66 The fact that my desire to develop my capacities and use my
resources can conflict with those very same desires in my neighbor does not pose
an intractable problem for peaceful, public life or for the basic liberty of others to
pursue their self-chosen ends. In the liberal theory of politics, organizations and
groups independent of the state constitute arenas in which different interests,
identities, and aspirations can flourish. A pluralistic civil society is an end in and
of itself because the many associations of civil society enable individuals to
pursue their self-chosen life projects; pluralism is necessary to liberty. Civil
society also serves the consequentialist purpose of checking state power and
thereby contributing to democracy. Private organizations constitute centers of
power that compete with the state and can thus curb the excesses of electoral and
bureaucratic politics. Furthermore, through the associational life of civil society,
citizens can examine government policy critically and mobilize for and against
the hundreds of choices made every day by elected and appointed public
officials.
The importance liberal thinkers attach to pluralism and the different
visions of the good life leads them to adopt a highly inclusive definition of civil

See, e.g., GREGOR EKIERT & JAN KUBIC, REBELLIOUS CIVIL SOCIETY: POPULAR PROTEST AND
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN POLAND, 1989-93, at 44 (1999).
66 See Michael Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, in COMMUNITY WORKS
123, 132 (E.J. Dionne ed., 1998); Michael Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL
CIVIL SOCIETY 7, 18, 25 (Michael Walzer ed. 1995); Terry Nardin, Private and Public Roles in Civil
Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 29, 30, 33 (Michael Walzer ed., 1995) (identifying
"liberal" and "communitarian" strands in Walzer's exposition of civil society and putting forward a
pure liberal argument).
65
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society. All purposes and all modes through which individuals combine to
further those purposes fit within the definition, as long as the organization is not
part of the coercive apparatus of the state. Market-based organizations-corporations, labor unions, employer associations, and industry lobbies--as well
as families, neighborhood watches, veterans associations, and environmental
groups, all count as civil society.67
The liberal model generates a number of prescriptions for the public
policy of civil society. Foremost among these, the state must guarantee the
fundamental rights of free speech and free association.68 Without these rights,
individuals cannot pursue their diverse aims with other, like-minded
individuals, and civil society cannot criticize, oppose, and check state authority.
Some thinkers in the liberal tradition go further. Michael Walzer, for instance,
praises the associational life of civil society as "the actual ground where versions
of the good are worked out and tested . . . and proved to be partial, incomplete,
ultimately unsatisfying."69 But he also cautions that "civil society, left to itself,
generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can
challenge."70 Unlike other liberal thinkers, Walzer is concerned that the exercise
of liberty by one individual or group of individuals might diminish that of
others, and he believes that the state can mediate among conflicting liberty
claims without degenerating into authoritarianism. Hence, Walzer adds another
set of policy recommendations to the basic package of liberal rights. He
advocates a host of redistributive measures to enable those voluntary
associations disadvantaged by the inequitable distribution of material and moral
resources in contemporary societies--working families, consumer cooperatives,
labor unions, ethnic minorities, and the like--to further their ends and participate
in democratic life.71
Republican Theory
The republican justification for civil society is tied to the experience with
associational life in old, western democracies. In contrast to the studies of new
democracies, those of old democracies, mostly notably Robert Putnam's
magisterial review of American associational life in Bowling Alone, have shown
that membership in voluntary organizations is on the decline.72 In Bowling Alone,
Putnam demonstrates that, since the 1960s, membership in all types of

Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, supra note__at 19.
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 398-99 (2000)
(analyzing importance of First Amendment rights of speech and association for civil society).
69 Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, supra note__ at 17.
70 Id. at 23.
71 Id. at 23.
72 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000). For a critical examination of Putnam’s findings see RICHARD POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS:
A STUDY OF DECLINE 311 n. 63 (2001).
67
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organizations has dwindled, both in those directly engaged in civic life such as
the League of Women's Voters and those with recreational or other purposes
with little apparent connection to civic life, such as local singing clubs.
This phenomenon is troubling to Putnam and others because, in their
view, joining and participating in voluntary organizations trains men and
women for citizenship. In contrast to the liberal vision of democracy, the
republican model perceives a tension between the fulfillment of self-chosen aims
and the peaceful and prosperous ordering of public affairs. The pursuit of selfinterest and particularistic identities can precipitate the breakdown of
community—through civil war or, less dramatically, through ineffective
government, which, unable to provide basic public goods such as clean water
and healthcare in turn compromises liberty. In the republican vision, for society
to be possible and for government to work, individuals must learn certain skills
and virtues of citizenship--skills and virtues that redefine the concept of
individual liberty. And, according to Putnam and others, the voluntary
associations of civil society is where this learning occurs. Putnam articulates this
understanding of the relationship between liberty and good government as
social capital: in the small-scale setting of the bowling league or the local union
organization, individuals learn the habits of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust
that are necessary for all collective endeavors, including good government.
These habits, critical for organizing soccer games and neighborhood watches, are
likewise critical for voting for national representatives and engaging in public
debate with fellow citizens and public officials on the pressing matters of the
day.73
Modern day civil society enthusiasts might be surprised to hear that they
fit within a republican tradition that can be traced back to the classical Greek and
Roman republics, the civic humanists of the Italian Renaissance, and Rousseau.74
The analytical concept of social capital, based upon contemporary game theory
and the strategies necessary for overcoming the collective action dilemma
identified by game theory, appears a long way off from the republican virtue of
active citizenship. Perhaps even more puzzling than this identification of social
capital with republicanism is the well-known republican suspicion of
intermediate groups, a suspicion that such associations may command the
loyalties of citizens at the expense of their loyalties to the association of the
whole, namely the state. Nevertheless, the new idea of civil society as the
incubator of civic virtue necessary for democracy shares basic, common premises
with the old concept of republican democracy. In both, the individual pursuit of
particularized interests creates difficulties for government. The answer for both
is the creation of a common reservoir of values and aspirations, albeit through
See id. at 18-24; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993).
74 See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 36 (2d ed. 1996); NOBERTO BOBBIO & MAURIZIO VIROLI,
THE IDEA OF THE REPUBLIC 8-14 (Allan Cameron trans. 2003).
73
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slightly different means: experience in the voluntary associations of civil society
in the social capital school of thought, and education in civic and moral virtues in
the republican one.
Republican theory, more selective than liberal theory in defining the
ambit of civil society, generally excludes two types of associations whose aims
and internal structure are such that they cannot serve as incubators of the
reciprocity and trust skills necessary to the pursuit of public aims. The first are
market actors--corporations, partnerships, other profit-seeking entities, and the
small, specialized pressure groups that represent their interests in public life.75
Maximizing profits in capitalist markets and influencing politics to the material
advantage of corporations do not require reciprocity and trust and hence do not
lead to the creation of social capital. In collective behavior oriented towards
markets, the material rewards of success are immediate enough that the
participants need not develop the norms necessary to sustain collective action
and achieve success in other spheres. Furthermore, the rigidly hierarchical
internal structure of most large economic entities enables them to pursue goals
without developing social capital among their employees. 76 Hierarchy exists
because those at the top have numerous material incentives to induce compliance
from those at the bottom. In other words, hierarchical organizations can rely
more heavily than other organizational forms on the concentration of material
resources among their governing members--e.g. the power to hire and fire, set
salaries, and decide on office space--to induce others to further the organization's
aims. Therefore, these organizations can survive without the social capital that is
vital to other associations.
The second type of association that republican theorists exclude from the
ambit of civil society is the specialized organization that focuses on political
advocacy and that has neither a rank-and-file membership nor the capacity to
mobilize large numbers of individuals when necessary.77 Like firms, the internal
dynamics of small pressure groups, whether they fall into the private- or publicinterest categories, are not conducive to building social capital and fostering
civic-minded individuals. That is because the professionals who staff the
national offices of organizations such as the Center for Science in the Public
Interest (a foundation-funded, pro-consumer group) or Citizens for a Sound
Economy (a corporate-funded, anti-big government group) have very little daily
See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note__ at 91-92 (describing features of employment
relationship that undermine social capital).
76 Some economists argue that forms of economic organization other than firms and corporations-for instance market-based contracting relations and networks--depend on social capital. See, e.g.,
James Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 57 (1998). In
this paper I do not enter into that debate, so I leave open the question of whether firms that engage
primarily in the network form of economic organization can be considered part of civil society.
77 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note__ at 52 (discussing low social capital value of lobbying
groups ranging from the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Automotive
Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and the National Rifle Association).
75
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connection to the individuals and the interests they represent. Citizens might
agree with their political aims and even donate money to their causes, but it is
unlikely that citizens will be spurred by such organizations to engage in other
forms of civic action.
The republican justification for civil society, like the liberal one, gives rise
to a number of public policy recommendations. Many of them are directed at
individual citizens, rather than at government policymakers, on the theory that
social capital must, at least in part, be rebuilt from below, through the personal
choice to join and participate in community life and voluntary associations.78
Some of the recommendations, however, are directed at statesmen, too. In Better
Together, the policy-oriented book that followed on the heels of the rich,
empirical case for social capital in Bowling Alone, Putnam makes a number of procivil society suggestions for statesmen:79 The tax code, through deductions and
other incentives for donations to voluntary organizations, can promote civil
society. Smart urban planning can enable individuals to spend less time
commuting and more time participating in associations. Employment and labor
laws that would allow working parents to demand flexible work schedules can
help citizens spend more time with their children and become involved in
community initiatives. Public investment in education creates one of the
important pre-conditions for participating in associational life and developing
social capital. Local government institutions and procedures that give grassroots
associations a say in public decisionmaking can create incentives for such
associations to form in the first place. Reflecting on a civil society experience in
Portland, Oregon, Putnam says: "By opening up to local organizations and
giving them responsibility, government created an incentive for local
organization. On the other hand, the fact that activists pressured the city
government to give them a voice was integral to that development."80 Most
simply, government can promote civil society by giving citizen associations legal
powers and tax dollars that ordinarily would be used and spent by public
officials. For example, Putnam cites these pro-civil society government policies:
the decision of the City of Boston to delegate the power of eminent domain to
allow a local neighbor association to purchase and develop land in central
Boston; state and federal funding for a tutoring program in Philadelphia
sponsored and run by a local volunteer group; state funding for a jobs program
and a sewer system that were the object of a grassroots faith-based campaign in
Texas.
Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol has developed an important critique
of Putnam's thesis and has put forward her own--still fundamentally republican-

See Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, 150 Things You Can Do To Build Social Capital,
available at http://www.bettertogether.org.
79 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER 271-79 (2003).
80 See PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER, supra note__ at 273.
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-model of civil society.81 Skocpol argues, contra Putnam, that what is
troublesome about the history of twentieth-century American civic life is not the
decline in the absolute number of associations and membership, but the decline
in a certain type of association and membership: nationwide organizations with
local chapters that mobilize citizens from many different walks of life in the
pursuit of common goals, such as the Order of the Sons of Temperance, the
Young Men's Christian Association, and the National Congress of Mothers
(PTA).82
The decline in large membership associations is troubling to Skocpol
because for national government to work, citizens must develop solidarities and
institutional structures than enable them to join together with their counterparts
across the nation to press for common causes. As in the standard republican
account, Skocpol believes that civil society can overcome the tension between the
pursuit of self-chosen aims and the good life in a society. However, Skocpol
argues that in a political system that is national in scope, civil society must also
be national, for otherwise elites will be able to act without any contribution from
the broad mass of citizens scattered throughout the nation and disempowered by
the lack of an associational connective tissue. Without truly national citizenship,
elites will inevitably make public decisions to further their own ends and not
those of ordinary people. This goes for associational elites as much as for
economic and government ones: with the current trend toward the
professionalization of citizen advocacy groups, the post-material values of the
upper-middle class professionals who staff and donate to public interest groups
drown out the social justice concerns of the working class.83
Skocpol's understanding of the contribution associations make to national
democracy leads to her to define civil society somewhat differently from the
social capital theorists. Although, like them, she excludes profit-making entities
and their associations as well as small, professionalized pressure groups without
a membership base, she also excludes purely local groups that have no ambition
to engage in public debate or to take part in civic life beyond the neighborhood
or town.84
As for the prescriptive part of Skocpol's analysis, she makes a number of
recommendations "designed to get broadly organized groups of people into politics."85
In marked contrast with Putnam's approach, her proposals are designed to foster
associations that pursue a particular type of aim--political--and that do so by
mobilizing and involving citizens on a nation-wide basis. This, Skocpol argues,
might be accomplished by repealing laws currently on the books that prohibit
See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN
CIVIC LIFE (2003).
82 See id. at 26-27.
83 See id. at 240.
84 See id. at 12-13, 227.
85 See id. at 283.
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associations from donating to political campaigns and that discourage
associations from fostering political debate among their members and from
engaging in partisan politics.86 In addition, Skocpol suggests that civil society, as
well as national democratic politics, might be strengthened by procedures that
give associations with significant and far-flung memberships a special place in
legislative deliberations in Congress.87
Communitarian Theory
Communitarian theories of civil society, like republican ones, have
become salient in contemporary academic and political debates because of the
impoverished state of associational life in modern-day America.88 Unlike
republicans, however, communitarians do not simply perceive a tension between
the choice and realization of personal life projects and a stable and prosperous
political community; rather, they deny that such choices are ever made
independent of the wider social and political community to which individuals
belong. Individual identities are constituted by the spheres of family,
neighborhood, and associations--otherwise known as civil society--that
individuals inhabit.89 The leading communitarian theorist Amitai Etzioni
elaborates on this perspective from the viewpoint of society, as opposed to
individual identity:
[A] well-functioning society, let alone a good one, requires a core
of substantive (rather than merely procedural) shared values,
which in part define not only public but also private proper
behavior. These values are transmitted from generation to
generation by the family, schools, and the community (including
its places of worship and civic associations). Moral dialogues then
recast values bequeathed by earlier generations.90
Because of this theory of individual liberty and political community, the decline
of associational life in contemporary American is an especially urgent problem

Skocpol also puts forward a series of bottom-up proposals, aimed at citizens and activists. Chief
among them is to mobilize locally and develop a solid, nationwide following, while at the same
time lobbying at the federal level, in Washington, D.C. See id. at 266-76.
87 See id. at 289.
88 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL
TRUTHS (1998); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CHIKENT L. REVIEW 583 (2000); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1995); WILLIAM GALSTON,
LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991); Michael S. Joyce & William A. Schambra, A New Civic Life, in PETER L
BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 27-29
(Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996) (expounding a conservative communitarian view).
89 See Susan Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L. J. 417, 419 (1997).
90 See Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
355 (2000).
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for communitarians. The personal and collective good lives are inextricably
intertwined, and both are inconceivable without a civil society that nurtures and
imparts certain core values.
Given the communitarian conceptualization of civil society, the
understanding of which associations count as civil society differs from that of
liberal and republican theories. Civil society in communitarian thinking is
mainly local--family, neighborhood, and town--for only in those settings are
relations with others so thick and frequent that personhood is shaped by
community. The public policy recommendations made by communitarians are
designed to foster this form of local associationalism. First, they advocate a
retreat of the state from social life.91 Communitarians oppose the social welfare
programs established in the 1960s on the grounds that such programs attempted
to replace the family, community, and church with the state and public
bureaucracies and that, in doing so, undermined America's social fabric. Many
believe that legislation like Aid to Families with Dependent Children did more to
harm than to improve the individual life chances of welfare recipients. By
returning social responsibility to families and local communities, reformers on
the right believe that their particular form of civil society will be revived.
Second, to the extent that federal and state governments continue to exercise
authority in areas such as welfare and education, communitarian reformers
argue that the tax dollars and legal powers of the state should go directly to local
charities, churches, and communities. This would be achieved through policy
instruments such as tax deductions for donations to charities92 and federal grants
to churches and local philanthropic associations that provide social services.93
As Skocpol notes, the communitarian and social capital schools of
thought share a certain affinity.94 Both communitarians and social capitalists
argue that good government is predicated upon the thick, interpersonal relations
that are found most often at the local level; therefore both gravitate to many of
the same prescriptions for individual action and government reform.
Nonetheless, the critical difference that separates the two should also be
appreciated: communitarians identify a specific list of values that the associations
of civil society are to promote--values such as devotion to one's children and
parents, giving to the less fortunate, and belief in God--while republicans avoid

David Boaz, Expansive Solutions, Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1995 ("The message of 1994--like the
message of 1776 and 1789, one might add--is not that the federal government should rebuild
families and communities. It is that federal government should get out of their lives.").
92 See Senator Dan Coats, Can Congress Revive Civil Society?, POL’Y REV., JAN.-FEB. 1996, NO. 75, p. 25.
93 See Foreword by President George W. Bush, in THE WHITE HOUSE, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF
COMPASSION (2001). Skocpol argues convincingly that such efforts will simply lead to the
bureaucratization and professionalization of voluntary associations and therefore will be selfdefeating insofar as they are designed to strengthen civil society. See Skocpol, supra note__ at 26065.
94 See SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note__ at 9.
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privileging one set of ends over another, except for the fundamental civic virtues
of cooperation and trust.95
Cosmopolitan Theory
Cosmopolitan theorists--analysts of systems of government that extend
beyond the nation-state--make yet a fourth set of arguments on the interrelated
issues of the democratizing effects of civil society, the organizations that count as
civil society, and the policy measures that should be adopted in favor civil
society. Just as liberal theorists are impressed by the resurgence of civil society
in the Third Wave of democratization, and republican and communitarian
theorists are troubled by the decline of civic life in the United States,
cosmopolitan theorists are stirred by the rise of associations and social
movements that span the globe. Associations and informal networks that
mobilize individuals across national borders, focus on global issues, and target
multiple countries and multilateral regimes in order to achieve their goals, are
multiplying.96 This phenomenon includes long-standing organizations, such as
Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund, as well as more
spontaneous social movements, such as the anti-globalization networks
responsible for the protests at the WTO ministerial in Seattle. Cosmopolitan
theorists hope that the new, world-wide mobilization from below can serve as
the catalyst for the democratization of global regimes.
The case for global civil society has not been made with the same analytic
precision as the arguments for civil society at the domestic level. Nevertheless,
many of the same themes can be discerned. The liberal vision of associations as a
vehicle for the pursuit of individual life projects and as checks on state power is
implicit in much of the writing on global civil society.97 And the international aid
literature relies heavily on social capital and communitarian theories: today the
common wisdom among donor countries and international development
agencies is that aid should be given to local associations, not only to
governments. The reasons for this policy shift are generally of the social capital
and communitarian varieties: by giving such associations responsibility for
implementing development projects and undertaking social service functions,
international aid will build citizenship skills, improve the capacity for selfgovernment, and strengthen communities.98
See Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, supra note__at 366, 367, 375, 376.
See RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE 106, 199, 253 (1995); JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY 8-20 (2003); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 10-11 (1998).
97 See JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note__ at 169, 202.
98See World Bank, 2003 Annual Report, 13, 18, 71; UN Development Programme, Partners in Human
Development: UNDP and Civil Society Organizations, 17, 22, 23, available at http://www.undp.org/cso;
UN Development Programme, Partners in Human Development: UNDP and Civil Society
Organizations, A Policy of Engagement, available at htttp://www.undp.org/cso/policies.html
("Possible entry points for UNDP-CSO collaboration").
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Notwithstanding some overlap with the domestic literature, the literature
on global governance also reflects a distinct theory of civil society and
democracy. According to thinkers like Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David
Held, Mary Kaldor, and John Keane, a global society is necessary to curb the
forces of global capital and to ensure that political institutions of global
governance vindicate the ambitions and desires of ordinary people throughout
the world.99 In this line of thought, globalization not only creates benefits, but
imposes severe hardships, to which heads of state and international bureaucrats
in control of international regimes are unable to respond. The elites that
negotiate and administer international agreements cannot ensure that the forces
of global capital are harnessed to the advantage of ordinary people. For
cosmopolitans, it is critical that citizens of one country come to identify with
citizens of another country based on their shared, human experiences.
Transnational groups based on rural and urban poverty, the market, and
environmental depredation should compete and interact with other transnational
groups to influence public decisionmakers in the global polity. Global civil
society is the key to creating a truly democratic international order, for only
when citizens organize and identify with others in different parts of the world
can they can assert control over the forces of global capitalism and the illegal
actions of states in the international realm.
Transnational social forces provide the only vehicle for the
promotion of the law of humanity, a normative focus that is
animated by humane sustainable development for all peoples,
North and South, and seeks to structure such commitments by
way of human geo-governance . . . . To suggest the political
dynamics associated with these conceptions, I propose the
terminology of 'globalization-from-below' to identify these
transnational democratic forces, and their implicit dedication to the
creation of a global civil society that is an alternative scenario of the
future to that of the global political economy being shaped by
See Daniele Archibugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL
COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 198, 222 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held, &
Martin Köhler, eds., 1998); COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD:
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995); Richard Falk, Global Civil Society: Perspectives, Initiatives, Movements, 26 OXFORD DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES 99, 100 (1998); RICHARD FALK, ON HUMAN GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS:
THE WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT REPORT OF THE GLOBAL CIVILIZATION INITIATIVE, 106 (1995);
KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note__ 2, 173; David Held, Democracy and Globalization, in REIMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 11, 22-23 (Daniele
Archibugi, David Held, & Martin Köhler, eds., 1998); Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society, in THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 559, 560 (David Held & Anthony McGrew, eds., 2000); P.
Wapner, The Normative Promise of Nonstate Actors: A Theoretical Account of Global Civil Society, in
PRINCIPLED WORLD POLITICS: THE CHALLENGE OF NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 261, 267 (P.
Wapner & L.E. J. Ruiz eds., 2000).
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transnational market forces. The hopes of humanity depend, in
my view, upon the capacities of globalization- from-below to
challenge effectively the prevailing dominance of globalizationfrom-above in a series of key arenas that can be identified in very
general terms as the UN (and other international institutions and
regimes), the media, the orientation of states.100
Cosmopolitans define civil society very differently from liberal,
republican, and communitarian thinkers. For cosmopolitans, interest and
identity associations are not, in and of themselves, civil society. Global civil
society is the global people. This stands in marked contrast with domestic
theories. At the domestic level, "civil society" is distinct from "the people": "civil
society" refers exclusively to organizations outside the state; "the people" refers
to long-standing national identities embodied in national constitutions, electoral
politics, and the representative institutions of democracy. Further,
cosmopolitans are categorical in excluding large market actors--namely,
multinational corporations and organizations representing multinationals--from
their definition of civil society. Given that global capital is one of the forces to be
curbed by civil society, organizations and individuals that serve the interests of
capital cannot be part of civil society.
A global civil society as an integrated public sphere in which national
borders disappear and a single people emerges is a very demanding definition.
It should not come as any surprise that, in the opinion of most scholars, it does
not yet exist.101 Thinkers like John Keane, Richard Falk, and Mary Kaldor,
dissatisfied with the current state of global capitalism and international regimes,
urge social activists to mobilize transnationally and to fight for a more just,
peaceful, and environmentally sound world. This prescription echoes those of
their republican and communitarian counterparts, who also exhort citizens to
organize from below.
In addition, a number of cosmopolitan theorists have called for a directly
elected world parliament that would represent global civil society in
international lawmaking. They believe that elections and a legislative assembly
would ensure that the voice of civil society is heard by the state elites and
Richard Falk, The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil
Society Institutions, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER, 63, 170-71
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds. 1995) (emphasis added).
101 See, e.g., Marie-Josée Massicotte, 'Local' Organizing and 'Global' Struggles: Coalition-Building for
Social Justice in the Americas, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS LIMITS 105, 105-06 (Gordon Laxer &
Sandra Halperin eds., 2003); Lisa Sundstrom, Limits to Global Civil Society: Gaps Between Western
Donors and Russians NGOs, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS LIMITS 146, 146-47 (Gordon Laxer &
Sandra Halperin eds., 2003). Steve Charnovitz and I have found that civil society in the
transatlantic context also comes up short when this demanding definition is used. See Francesca
Bignami & Steve Charnovitz, Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 255 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001)
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international bureaucrats that at present control international regimes. For
instance, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have proposed a "Global Peoples
Assembly." 102 Yet voluntary associations and intermediate organizations are
conspicuously absent from the single institutional reform proposed by
cosmopolitans.103 While Falk and Strauss argue that citizens and their
associations should have the right to lobby the Global Peoples Assembly, they do
not recommend a direct role for private organizations in the decisions taken by
the Assembly, nor does the logic of representative democracy suggest such a
role.
The ambition expressed in the proposals for a world parliament is
admirable but, on closer examination, such proposals reveal a fundamental
inconsistency. In instituting a world assembly, cosmopolitan thinkers assume
into being precisely that which they lament is lacking from world politics: a
global civil society or global people. That is, cosmopolitan thinkers assume the
existence of a global people that would mobilize during elections, vote, and then
follow and monitor the decisions of their global representatives. Yet it is not
obvious that simply instituting elections and a world parliament would lead to
the formation of such a global consciousness.104 The European Parliament is a
legislative assembly that operates in what was previously a classic international
organization, with powers beyond the wildest dreams of even the most
optimistic cosmopolitans. Yet the European public has displayed a stubborn
indifference to elections for the European Parliament and the daily activities of
their parliamentarians.105 Cosmopolitans do not have a clear vision of how

See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the
Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 193 (2000).
103 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have suggested that, as a first step towards the Global Peoples
Assembly, representatives of civil society organizations should constitute the Assembly but that,
shortly thereafter, civil society organizations and their representatives should draw electoral
districts, decide on a voting system, and hold elections. See Andrew Strauss, Overcoming the
Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a Peoples Assembly, in REFRAMING THE
INTERNATIONAL: LAW, CULTURE, POLITICS 83, 83 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 2002). Expedience,
however, is the only justification for giving this task to civil society organizations and it is far from
self-evident that, once their representatives had taken their seats in the Global Peoples Assembly,
they would be willing to relinquish their seats in favor of elected representations or be able to
organize such elections.
104 Hassan El Menyawi has recently put forward a interesting proposal for multiple assemblies--one
for each nation-- that combines global representation with the necessary first step of creating a
global people that selects representatives and thus is represented. He propose one general
assembly for each nation. Each such assembly would be composed of 191 representatives, which
would be elected jointly by the electorates of two different nations: the nation where the general
assembly is located and one of the other 190 nations in the world. This process, according to El
Menyawi, would foster deliberation across national borders and hence would improve democracy
in an interdependent world. See Hassan El Menyawi, Toward Global Democracy: Thoughts in
Response to the Rising Tide of Nation-to-Nation Interdependencies, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 96,
125, 130-31 (2004).
105 See DAVID JUDGE & DAVID EARNSHAW, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 70-76 (2003).
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public policy can promote an integrated, global public sphere or how
associations outside the state can contribute--and, through public policy
initiatives, can be encouraged to contribute--to the creation of such an integrated
public sphere.
The arguments and implications of the theories of civil society are
summarized below.
Table 1: Theories of Civil Society: Justifications, Definitions, and
Policy Prescriptions
Liberal

Justification

Definition

Policy prescriptions

Allows individuals to
realize diverse life
projects and checks
government power

All associations

Liberal rights

•

Build social
capital among
citizens

•

•

•

Encourage
mobilization of
citizens on a
national scale

All associations
except
corporations,
corporate
lobbies, and
professionalized
pressure groups

•

Large,
nationwide
federations
engaged in
national political
debates

Tax code reform to
encourage private
donations, urban
planning to reduce
sprawl, employment
regulation to allow
workers to spend more
time with family and
participate in
community
organizations, public
investment in
education,
opportunities for
participation in local
government, transfer of
public powers and tax
dollars to associations

•

Provide incentives for
associations to engage
in partisan politics,
afford large
membership
associations a special
role in Congressional
deliberations

Republican
•

Robert
Putnam

•

Theda
Skocpol

Communitarian

Mores inculcated by
civil society essential
to self-identity and
good government

Family, churches,
local associations
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Reduce size of state, transfer
responsibility for social
services from federal
government to local
charities and churches
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Cosmopolitan

Assert popular
control over forces of
globalization

Integrated, global
public sphere, i.e.,
"the global people,"
excluding capital

Global Peoples Assembly

The Implications of Civil Society Theory for Global Governance
What do these different theories of civil society have to say about the
institutional reform of international organizations such as the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization, and the European Union? First, the liberal
understanding of civil society has considerable merit and should be embraced by
global policymakers. Contemporary democracy is inconceivable without a
vibrant public sphere in which citizens and their associations have the right to
criticize government actors. Of course, comparative constitutional law
demonstrates that contemporary democracies part ways over where the rights to
free expression and association end and the rights to privacy and against
discrimination begin. However, it is not necessary to dwell here on any of these
thorny debates of constitutional law. It is enough to observe that citizens and
their organizations must enjoy a core of speech, association, and other liberal
rights if the different sites of global governance are to be democratic.
The agreement among the liberal, republican, and communitarian
positions on the importance of such rights reveals their foundational quality.
Rights of speech and association can co-exist quite happily with republican tax
code reform, investment in public education, opportunities for participation in
local and national government, and the transfer of tax dollars and public powers
to non-state associations. There is no inconsistency in arguing that the National
Organization of Women and the National Rifle Association should be able to
march and petition government officials and benefit from exemptions under the
tax code. Liberal and communitarian models of civil society are also compatible:
for community organizations to flourish, they must benefit from freedom of
association and expression, including freedom of religion. This is not to deny
that these two theories of state and society can come into conflict. The difficulty
comes from the invocation of rights such as freedom of expression in support of
certain world views that undermine the substantive values at the core of the
communitarian associations of family, church, and neighborhood.106
Benedict Kingsbury has argued that, in the international sphere, the dominant liberal model of
speech and associationalism linked to the First Amendment to the U.S Constitution is at odds with
the articulation of rights and demands by indigenous peoples and other ascriptive groups, groups
with considerable affinities to communitarian notions of civil society. See Benedict Kingsbury, First
Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal
NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183 (2002). Nevertheless, as Kingsbury
himself observes, nothing intrinsic to the First Amendment leads to the denigration or exclusion of
indigenous peoples in the international realm, rather it is the political theory of liberalism more
generally speaking that produces this result. In Kingsbury's words: "A liberal commitment to
106
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Communitarians like Amitai Etzioni, however, argue that liberal rights can be
reconciled with communitarian moral responsibilities.107 In global regimes,
regimes which, by definition, include many nations and traditions, cooperation is
possible only if local identities and values give way to liberal rights and tolerance
when the two come into irreconcilable conflict.
Liberal theory's policy prescriptions are largely in place in the global
realm and are firmly established in the European Union. The Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which contain provisions on freedom of opinion and
expression, and freedom of assembly and association, has been ratified by over
130 countries. Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Covenant serves as a source of law binding upon international organizations
when they deal directly with citizens and associations.108 In the European Union,
the Court of Justice has guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and
association since the 1980s, and these rights have been codified in the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights.109 Furthermore, one of the prerequisites of the
right to oppose global policies--the right to know what government has decided,
i.e. transparency--is becoming standard practice in global regimes.110
Transparency, as used here, is different from attending multilateral committee
meetings, submitting policy statements, and filing amicus briefs: it is the duty of
global institutions to broadcast their decisions at the time they are made in
language accessible to the ordinary citizens so that citizens and their associations
can debate, criticize, and hold public officials to account.
Even though liberal theory is widely accepted, its prescriptions are not
always heeded by international policymakers. Organizations like the World
Bank and the WTO have real incentives to avoid their constitutional duties in the
interests of speedy policymaking. It is tempting for statesmen and bureaucrats

voluntarism and individual choice underpins a model of international civil society in which
voluntary NGOs (or corporations) are the paradigmatic actors. . . . While liberal political theory
has embraced certain forms of NGOs (including civic associations and, with palpable misgivings,
corporations and industry associations) in which entry and exit are voluntary, it has hesitated to
embrace ascriptive intermediate groups." Id. at 187-88.
107 See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY (1996); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 4-5 (1993).
108 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71, arts. 19 & 20, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19 & 21, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 575, 576 (5th ed. 1998).
109 Case 100/88, Oyowe and Traore v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 4285 (freedom of expression); Case
C-274/99P, Connolly v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. I-1611 (freedom of expression); Case C-415/93,
Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 79 (freedom of
association); European Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 11 (freedom of expression) & art. 12
(freedom of assembly).
110 See supra text accompanying nn. (describing transparency measures in World Bank and WTO);
Bignami, Creating European Rights, supra note__ (describing transparency in the EU).
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in international organizations to turn a blind eye to state practices that render
debate and opposition to international economic policies impossible because
such statesmen and bureaucrats have an obvious interest in pushing their
policies through at the domestic level. The same incentives threaten freedom of
expression at the global level: vigorous protest on the streets of Seattle, Doha,
and Cancun; on the pages of newspapers; and on the web can undermine public
support for international economic policies. Therefore, when given the choice,
politicians and bureaucrats prefer less, not more, speech. Furthermore, unlike
the European Union, members of international economic organizations are not
all democracies, so the institutions of member countries cannot be expected to
impose democracy and constitutional rights from below as has been the
European experience. And, again unlike the European Union, international
economic organizations do not have independent courts to which individuals
can appeal to fight for their freedoms of expression and association. In sum,
while the liberal rights necessary for a vibrant civil society might figure
prominently in the rhetoric and written law of the international realm, the
realities of international organizations suggest that such rights are fragile and
extreme vigilance is necessary to preserve them.
The republican and communitarian theories of civil society similarly
share one, important point of convergence: in neither do corporate actors or
professionalized pressure groups that lack substantial memberships count as
civil society. In other words, political philosophy offers no support for extending
policies targeted at civil society to corporations, corporate lobbies, and public
interest advocacy groups without a membership base. While the indifference to
profit-driven actors is not particularly surprising, the absence of any analytical or
empirical basis for institutional measures targeted at small groups of social
activists goes against common wisdom. This is because many of the most
vociferous advocates of civil society in the global realm are small, social justice
NGOs; yet in the civil society lexicon, they fall into the pressure group category,
not the civil society one.
Nevertheless activists without a rank-and-file might be able to make
claims on the institutions of global governance on other grounds. For instance,
some groups can argue that they promote substantive ends that have been
unfairly excluded from global politics and that therefore their voices should
count more. Or, they might claim that small networks of activists help build an
integrated, global public sphere and that public resources and powers should be
allocated to such networks to support their initiatives. Yet no political
philosophy, not even cosmopolitan theory, articulates these hypotheses. The
case for networks and associations of activists that focus on promoting their
public interest agendas rather than building broad-based, grassroots
constituencies has not been made.
Although republican and communitarians thinkers can agree on which
actors to exclude from civil society, their affirmative definitions of civil society
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and their related policy prescriptions differ considerably. Social capital and
communitarian theory part ways with the national republican view. Both Robert
Putnam and Amitai Etzioni stress local forms of associationalism while Theda
Skocpol argues that large, diverse membership organizations are the backbone of
American democracy.111 International organizations have already taken on
board, grosso modo, the prescriptions of the social capital and communitarian
lines of analysis, especially institutions like the World Bank whose policies are
targeted at the local or regional levels and whose mission is development. By
involving local NGOs in loan management and giving small grants to NGOs, the
World Bank and other international development organizations are clearly
building upon the insights of thinkers like Putnam. Funding local associations,
allowing them to participate in international aid decisions, and giving them
responsibility for putting the aid to good use are policy initiatives that follow
closely the prescriptions of the social capital and communitarian models.
International organizations and the government recipients of development aid
could certainly do better, as suggested by some of the criticism canvassed
above.112 Nonetheless, the institutions of global governance are headed in the
right direction, and the social capital and communitarian ideas of civil society
should serve as an impetus for further institutional reform.
And what of Skocpol’s analysis? It does not appear that global
policymakers have taken notice of Skocpol’s theory of civil society. Yet she
focuses on a historical phenomenon—the development of a national economy
and polity in the United States—that bears some resemblance to today’s
accumulation of economic and political power in new sites of global governance.
Skocpol chronicles the simultaneous rise of a national government and national
voluntary associations in nineteenth and early twentieth-century America. She
notes the vital role of such associations in enabling ordinary citizens to
participate in democratic politics:
Directly, therefore, as well as in a number of indirect ways,
America's traditional voluntary membership federations fostered
I do not address an additional issue that divides civil society thinkers. Should resources be
redistributed to ensure that all citizens have an equal opportunity to form and participate in
voluntary associations? This is a cross-cutting issue that is tied to the larger question of social
justice, a question which divides thinkers who otherwise join forces in articulating a common view
of the role of associations in democratic life. For instance, while Michael Walzer would use state
power to redistribute resources and promote certain associations, others in the liberal camp, more
suspicious of the state after the experience with totalitarian regimes in Eastern and Central Europe,
would not. Compare Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, supra note__at 26 with Nardin, Private and
Public Roles in Civil Society, supra note__at 30-32. Thinkers who advocate local associationalism are
similarly divided. While Putnam advocates transfers of resources from wealthy to poor
communities, many conservative communitarians do not. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra
note__ at 413. The issue of social justice affects almost every aspect of political life and therefore
goes beyond the scope of this narrowly focused discussion of civil society.
112 See supra text accompanying nn.__.
111
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active citizenship and made a difference in politics and
governance. Federations were especially vital in building an
American democracy in which ordinary people could participate,
gain skills, and forge recurrent ties to one another--not just locally
but also across communities, states, and regions of a vast and
expanding nation. . . . Over the long run of U.S. history, voluntary
membership federations have both complemented and rivaled
political parties in setting the course of politics and government.
By coordinating and inspiring so many people across the myriad
districts that elect representatives to U.S., state, and national
legislatures, voluntary federations have been able to exert
democratic leverage. Federations combine state and national
reach with local presence, the best way to influence U.S. elected
officials.113
This explanation of the importance of nationwide federations is
instructive for cosmopolitans. As mentioned earlier, cosmopolitans oppose the
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of elites who run
multinational corporations and set the course of international economic
organizations. But cosmopolitans also recognize that the global people cannot
exercise their democratic will because citizens are still separated by national
borders. The voluminous literature on the democratic deficit in the European
Union repeats this complaint. Without a European-wide political consciousness
and citizens that engage on the everyday questions settled in Brussels, Europe
cannot be truly democratic. One remedy to the cosmopolitan and European
dilemma, suggested by Skocpol's analysis, is the formation of large membership
organizations that span entire regions or, indeed, the globe. Far-flung
federations that routinely bring together their national members and associations
might enable citizens and activists throughout Europe--or even the world--to
mobilize across state lines, just as nationwide organizations with local chapters
did in early twentieth century America. Transnational associations might be one
means of overcoming the tension between central political and economic power
and local democracy.
What policy measures would encourage the creation of such membership
organizations? Some of the same initiatives undertaken by international
institutions to promote local civil society could be targeted also at transnational
civil society. Direct funding of citizen associations could go to organizations that
meet certain threshold requirements of numbers and geographic distribution of
membership. Moreover, in response to Skocpol's call to politics, such direct
funding should go not only to associations devoted to economic development or
social welfare, but also to those engaged in partisan, political activities. Finally,
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opportunities for participation in the policymaking of international organizations
could be reserved for such transnational associations. This would not be
participation in policymaking with mainly local effects, such as the
implementation and management of World Bank project loans, but rather
participation in policymaking of concern to multiple countries or entire regions
of the world. Allowing the participation of transnational associations would
mirror Skocpol's recommendation that American membership organizations of
national scope be given special access to Congressional deliberations.
Privileging transnational associations in global policymaking is not a
novel idea. It already occurs in the United Nations system and the European
Union. In the United Nations, large, international NGOs whose policy agendas
cover multiple issues qualify for general consultative status before the Economic
and Social Council.114 General consultative status entitles NGOs to receive
provisional agendas, place items on the agenda, sit as observers at public
meetings, submit brief written statements, consult with members of the
Secretariat, and request to make oral presentations at public meetings. In the
European Union, the Commission is required to consult advisory committees in
areas such as agriculture, the environment, and consumer policy.115 The
composition of such committees is generally weighted towards pan-European
federations of farmers, environmental groups and consumer organizations, not
purely national or local associations. Building on this precedent, international
organizations should adopt more extensive funding and participation measures
to encourage the formation of regional and global associations and transnational
solidarities.
In making these reforms, policymakers should not lose sight of the local.
It is important to remember communitarian Michael Sandel's admonition that in
a globalizing world, local community will and must continue to shape selfidentities, inculcate moral virtues and foster social learning:
It is difficult to imagine a [cosmopolitan] world in which persons
were so virtuous that they had no friends, only a universal
disposition to friendliness. The problem is not simply that such a
world would be difficult to bring about but that it would be
difficult to recognize as a human world. The love of humanity is a
noble sentiment, but most of the time we live our lives by smaller
solidarities. This may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral
sympathy. More important, it reflects the fact that we learn to

See UNITED NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE (NGLS), THE NGLS HANDBOOK OF UN
AGENCIES, PROGRAMMES, AND FUNDS WORKING FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (2d ed.
1997); Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society, in WHOSE WORLD IS IT
ANYWAYS 247-82 (John W. Foster, Anita Anand, Jing de la Rosa eds. 1999).
115 See Bignami, Creating European Rights, supra note__ at __.
114
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love humanity not in general but through its particular
expressions.
But even though a global neighborhood lacks the intimacy of the local, the
current historical circumstances of globalization and the vital role of
cosmopolitan solidarities in transforming international regimes into
transnational democracies, cannot be ignored.
The different theories of civil society contain important lessons for the
organization of global political life. Yet, in the final analysis, the philosophers
and activists of civil society are talking past one another. Philosophers of civil
society focus on the value of associational life free of the state. The theories
explain the importance of voluntary associations for political life in a democracy,
exhort citizens to join such associations, and recommend government measures
designed to promote their preferred forms of voluntary associations. However,
they do not develop a model of how civil society should shape democratic
decisionmaking nor do they articulate a series of institutional reforms that would
enact that model. Should associations demonstrate and write press articles, run
election campaigns, lobby legislators, sit on government committees, comment
on proposals for legislative and administrative action, or sue government
officials in court? The political philosophy does not address this series of
questions. Yet this is what the political debate in the different systems of global
governance is all about: how should associations outside the state, acting in an
integrated, cosmopolitan political space, inform public decisionmaking? For
guidance we must look elsewhere.
The Comparative Law of Democracy
For inspiration on civil society's place in democratic institutions, we
should look beyond the political philosophy to the comparative law of
democracies.116 The constitutions of contemporary democracies follow one of
116 Even when the question is reframed as “How do interest and identity groups fit with the
procedural requirements of democracy?” political philosophy is largely unhelpful. On this issue,
contemporary thinkers take opposite views. Civic republicans and deliberative democrats oppose
interest groups and identity politics in favor of deliberation among all citizens based on broadly
shared principles. According to thinkers such as Cass Sunstein, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis
Thompson, public decisions should be made through appeal to commonly accepted reasons, not
through bargains among competing interests or conflicting identities. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 13-36 (2004). In their view, enlightened majority rule
is guaranteed through the collective process of defining and redefining a shared set of values and
morals. By contrast, in Schumpeter's model of democracy, politicians vie for the support of voters
and interest groups play an important, benign role in serving as intermediaries between politicians
and voters. Interest groups facilitate the competitive democratic process. See DAVID HELD, MODELS
OF DEMOCRACY 185-91 (1996). My resort to the comparative law of democracy is, in part, a product
of the “conventionalist” or “hermeneutic” turn in contemporary philosophy. See MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note__; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989). This movement away from
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three patterns: pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism. 117 In pluralism,
multiple, competing interest groups have numerous opportunities to influence
policymaking, irrespective of their size or aims, through the legislature, the
bureaucracy, and the courts. In corporatism, certain intermediate organizations
are allowed to influence policymaking because their membership figures or their
objectives are believed to warrant giving them a special role, alongside
legislators, bureaucrats, and judges, in making public decisions.118 In
republicanism, citizen associations enable individuals to engage in the public life
of the nation through debate and protest, but those associations are not allowed
to take part directly in making public decisions.
International policymakers should appreciate that even though their
historical circumstances are novel, they do not act in a political or institutional
void in deciding on associational participation in global governance. Their
predilections for interest accommodation in the global realm are shaped by their
experiences in their distinct pluralist, corporatist, and republican democracies.
Even more important than self-awareness of national bias is what policymakers

deontological, deductive truths and towards more historically and culturally situated moralities
came as a reaction to Rawls’s Theory of Justice. By emphasizing the diversity of national experiences
with liberal democracy, yet only considering liberal societies, I strike an uneasy balance between
these two positions. But it is no more unstable than the balance struck in many of today’s great
works of political theory. See, e.g., JOHN TOMASI, LIBERALISM BEYOND JUSTICE: CITIZENS, SOCIETY AND
THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL THEORY (2001) (criticizing Rawls’s attempt to accommodate his
conventionalist critics in Political Liberalism). Moreover, comparative law—as compared to political
theory--has the great advantage of concreteness; the level of analysis is specific enough to assist
international policymakers with the details of institutional design.
117 See, e.g., Paul S. Adams, Is There a New Century of Corporatism? in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 17, 28 (Howard Wiarda ed., 3d ed. 2002); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY 197-232 (1996); Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
Performance, in THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 171 (1999); YVES MÉNY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN WESTERN
EUROPE 151-56 (Janet Lloyd trans. 2d ed. 1993); Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of
Corporatism?, 36 REV. OF POL. 85, 93-94 (1974); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS (1990). Most
political scientists distinguish only between corporatist and pluralist systems. However, some go
further and differentiate between systems in which interest groups are assured access to official
decisionmaking (pluralism or corporatism) and systems in which interest groups are
heterogeneous and competitive but generally are not allowed to influence government
policymaking (called here "republicanism"). See Vivien A. Schmidt, Europeanization of National
Democracies: The Differential Impact on Simple and Compound Polities, 13 POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE 113,
115-116 (distinguishing between "compound" and "simple" polities); POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN
EUROPE (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982) (characterizing French government as closed to interests and
ready to impose policy choices and German government as open to interests and eager to obtain
social consensus).
118 While most corporatist theorists focus on intermediate associations of capital and labor, the
corporatist relationship between state and society extends to the associations that have become
salient in the era of what Ronald Inglehart calls “post-material” values: environmental protection
groups, consumer groups, and identity groups based on national origin, sex, and race. See generally
RONALD INGLEHART AND CHRISTIAN WELZEL, MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE, AND DEMOCRACY:
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE (forthcoming).
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can learn from the different national experiences with interest and identity
groups in public life.
The following sections elaborate on pluralism, corporatism, and
republicanism by analyzing the constitutions, laws, and regulations of three
democracies that typify the distinct patterns of interest participation: the United
States, Germany, and France. The ambition of this Article is to speak to
policymakers, hence the need to enter into the law to understand the
implications of the different models for the institutions of global governance. In
exploring these national legal systems, the reader should bear in mind that even
within a system, the law of interest participation differs among policy areas and
often departs from the ideal type. Moreover, my claim is not that there is only
one law of pluralist democracy, one law of corporatist democracy, and one law
of republican democracy. The world's political systems undoubtedly contain
many others laws and models of democracy. But three is a good start in bringing
to light the different possibilities of associational participation in the institutions
of global governance.
The following discussion of the public law of interest accommodation
also examines the popular theories of democracy behind the law. Specific
theories of democracy informed the U.S., German, and French constitutions at
their beginnings and related, evolving popular ideas of democracy continue to
sustain these constitutions. In other words, public law reflects culturally specific
norms about how public affairs should be conducted; public law is also
grounded on certain beliefs as to the consequences for collective prosperity and
individual well-being of different institutional arrangements, including those for
associational participation.119 That the comparative law of interest
accommodation embodies culturally specific norms and beliefs suggests that the
differences must be taken seriously indeed. That certain beliefs, although
perfectly credible at home, cannot survive the realities of the global realm while
others can, shows that a principled choice among the competing theories can be
made for international organizations.
Pluralist Democracy
The United States is the only clear example of pluralist democracy.120 The
Constitution establishes a fragmented system of lawmaking which guarantees

See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 38-40 (2004)
(analyzing relationship between institutions and preferences, identities, and ideologies); Schmidt,
supra note__ at 126-131 (discussing relationship between institutions and ideas of democracy).
120 Although many other western democracies have a multiplicity of interest groups that are not
organized into peak associations and that compete among one another for influence, their political
systems do not afford the competing interest groups the same opportunities to influence
policymaking. Among the democracies covered in Arendt Lijphart's overview of political systems
around the world, it appears that Costa Rica and Columbia qualify as pluralist: they both score
relatively high on the interest group measure (2.50), they both are presidential systems (which is
119
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interest groups of all kinds numerous opportunities to influence policymaking.121
Legislative power is shared among the Senate, the House of Representative, and
the President, each of which is elected by different constituencies and serves
different terms. In the lawmaking process, therefore, interest groups have
multiple opportunities to shape outcomes.122
When legislation is sent to the bureaucracy for implementation, the law
continues to afford interest groups a central role in the policymaking process. In
the American presidential system of government, administrators are accountable
to both the President and legislators on Congressional oversight committees and,
through them, to multiple interest groups.123 Furthermore, the public has a right
to receive advance notice of rules, give their view on such rules, and receive a
detailed response to their objections from the administration.124 Because any
individual or interest association may go to court to enforce the right to notice,
comment, and a detailed explanation of the rule's basis and purpose, the
bureaucracy heeds the views of all associations, regardless of the association's
purposes or membership numbers. Moreover, courts require that administrators
apply what Thomas McGarity calls "comprehensive analytical rationality" to
regulatory problems: administrators must conduct a thorough and definitive
assessment of the costs and benefits of all possible regulatory options before
choosing the one that best fulfills the statutory mandate, even though such an
assessment is sometimes impossible in the face of scientific and political
realities.125 Comprehensive analytic rationality guarantees that the bureaucrats

related to high interest group access because of the division of power between the presidency and
the parliament), and they both score low on the executive dominance measure (which is related to
the presidential-parliamentary distinction). See Lijphart, supra note__, at 177, 119, 138.
121 See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 78-79, 139-43 (2002)
(describing fragmentation caused by American presidential and federalist system of government).
For the sake of brevity, this Article does not cover two other dimensions of political organization
that can contribute to more or less interest group access to government decisions: federalism and
two-party vs. multi-party systems. Id. at 105, 135.
122 It appears that the relationship between American political parties and interest groups is very
similar to the relationship between American lawmaking institutions and interest groups. One
recent study found that American political parties, in contrast with political parties in other
democracies, can often function as amalgams of interest groups rather than across-the-board vote
maximizers. See Clive S. Thomas, Toward a Systematic Understanding of Party-Group Relations in
Liberal Democracies, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 286-88 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 2001).
123 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 158 (describing system of “multiple
principals” under U.S. Constitution); Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, supra note__ at 117 (on
differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY 257-58 (describing competition between President and Congress for control of
administration).
124 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (setting down requirements of notice and comment rulemaking).
125 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 531 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Public Participation in Risk
Regulation, 1 RISK: ISSUES HEALTH & SAFETY 103, 112 (1990).
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will take seriously any objections made by the parties to the rulemaking
proceeding--including interest groups.
American law rarely entrusts private associations with public authority.
Interests and the associations through which they are expressed are considered
too partial and self-regarding to be able to handle matters of public concern.
Numerous industry associations set product and processing standards, but they
generally compete with other industry associations--they do not set "the"
standard for all the United States.126 Unlike other countries, private associations
are not empowered by statute or regulation to set standards for the entire
industry.127 State governments allow organizations of professionals such as
lawyers, architects, and engineers to set rules of conduct for their members and
police compliance with those rules. This regulatory practice, however, does not
extend beyond professional services to other sectors of the economy. Thus, local
chambers of commerce represent the interests of member firms and tradesmen
but do not assist the state in regulating their members, in contrast with France,
Germany, and Italy where chambers of commerce are entrusted with public
functions.128
Lastly, the courts are open to all individuals and interest groups to
challenge statutes as unconstitutional, to complain that agency action violates
principles of administrative law, and to enforce regulatory statutes against
private parties when administrative agencies fail to take the lead.129 Although
legal doctrines such as standing, reviewability, and ripeness are designed to
preserve legislative and administrative discretion and to limit the litigation
burden on the courts, the reach of such doctrines is very limited compared to

See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy
of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 23-25 (2003).
127 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking National
Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional delegation of power to the President, based in part on
de facto delegation of power to industry associations to set codes of fair competition). But see Jody
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 159 (2000) (discussing new practice of
negotiated rulemaking, in which “stakeholders” given decisive role); Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Industry, 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (discussing OSHA’s reliance on
standards of private standard-setting bodies in promulgating government standards); Federal
Trade Commission, 90th Anniversary Symposium 6 (Sept. 22-23, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/90thAnniv_Program.pdf (discussing “trade practice conference”
procedure in which industry members would vote on rules then considered by the Commission
and, if approved, violation of such rules would constitute “unfair method of competition” under
Federal Trade Commission Act).
128 See Mény, supra note__ at 146.
129 See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1721
(1975) (analyzing expansion of standing to challenge administrative action in 1960s and 1970s);
Richard Stewart & Cass Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982)
(analyzing more liberal approach to infering private causes of action to enforce public regulatory
statutes).
126
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other legal systems.130 To take the doctrine of standing in the administrative
context, litigants must overcome two hurdles before a court will entertain their
objections to administrative determinations. Litigants must satisfy the
constitutional three-prong test of injury, a causal connection between the alleged
injury and the administrative determination, and the possibility of redress
through judicial intervention; and litigants must show that they come "arguably"
within the "zone of injury" that the drafters of the enabling statute intended to
protect. But notice that the doctrine does not set the bar very high. As long as an
individual can prove an economic, environmental, or, in some instances,
aesthetic interest, that is remotely connected to the public policy considerations
underpinning the statute, she may challenge the administrative determination.
What are the preferences for public life and the beliefs about the
institutions of interest accommodation that underpin American constitutional
and administrative law? In pluralist democracy, particular interests and
identities are legitimate.131 In other words, citizens wish to express themselves in
public life through associations that attend to the specific and highly fragmented
interests and experiences of economics, region, sex, race, age, and so on, and they
believe that public life can prosper through this form of interest politics.
Engagement in public life based on particularistic group affiliations is the
premise of the political system. Yet, at the same time, the role of interest groups
in exercising public authority is more limited than elsewhere. That is because
associations based on interest are believed to function simply as conduits
through which individual citizens express their differences and inform
government decisionmaking. Interest associations do not themselves shape and
express broader public identities, commanding the loyalties of their members
just like nations command the loyalties of their citizens.
The pluralist understanding of interest is rooted in Madison's political
philosophy. Madison believed that passion, self-interest, and faction--impulses
hostile to individual rights and the welfare of the nation as a whole--were
inevitable among citizens and their elected representatives. A republican system
of government would be viable in a country the size of the United States only
because in such a vast territory a great number of interests would compete
against and check one another in public life. The academic study of American
politics after World War II drew on the Madisonian idea of interests as central to
public decisionmaking. Not only did Robert Dahl and David Truman observe

See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1671 (2004) (describing different types of constitutional courts and more restricted access in
the French and Italian models).
131 See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, Comments on Part 1, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 207, 209 (Paul
Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (contrasting “theory of group conflict that undergirds
the American perspective on political representation” with the German idea of “popular
democracy” and the “strong anti-interest group orientation that informs this [German]
jurisprudence”).
130
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the role of competing organized interests in persuading government officials to
allocate resources and enact laws and regulations, they also condoned the role of
interests in American public life.132 As long as the rules of the game--the
institutions that decided which interests would prevail at any given point in
time--enjoyed public consensus and as long as no element of society went
unrepresented in the interest group fray, the system would flourish. According
to Dahl and Truman, politics would be both stable and fair: no single group
would be able to secure control over government and use that control to change
the rules to its advantage, excluding other groups.
The normative vision was explicitly questioned by subsequent
generations. Congress and administrative agencies were being "captured " by
"special interests" rather than representing all interests fairly and neutrally.133
But the critique operated from a normative frame of reference in which interest
still drove politics, just a more representative, pluralist set of interests. For
citizens in the corporatist and republican traditions explored in the following
pages, the pluralist understanding of how democracy should be organized is
literally and figuratively foreign. Yet this category of thought--groups based on
interest and identity--dominates empirical investigations and theoretical analyses
of American politics.
Public complacency in the face of pluralist interest group politics is
related to a corresponding distrust of elected officials and government
bureaucrats. The Constitution splits and shares legislative and administrative
powers between the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President
because of the Founders' misgivings as to government by elected officials,
misgivings which today extend to the bureaucrats of the administrative state. In
the view of the Founders, citizens and their representatives were not inclined
toward public virtue, in marked contrast with the republican tradition of
Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Harrington. Thus, they believed it necessary to
design an unconventional system of separation of powers. Legislative and
executive powers were not allocated to different branches, but rather they were
spread across both the legislative and executive branches so that one set of
officials could check the other.134 This checking and balancing by government

See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1961).
133 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that small groups
have an easier time organizing to influence the political process); Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For)
Madison: An essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553 (discussing the phenomenon of
capture).
134 See Held, Models of Democracy, supra note__at 89-94; James Madison, Federalist No. 10, in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 160 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1981) (1787); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 190-98 (1967); POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note__at
513-25 (contrasting the American Constitution with the republican tradition of Machiavelli and the
English Civil War and Augustan period); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
132
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officials that represent different constituencies was caused by the Madisonian
perception of narrow interest rather than republican virtue as the motivating
force in democratic politics; today, the system of checks and balance is itself a
cause of the omnipresence of interest associations in American political life.
Distrust of public officials, in turn, is associated with limited government-together with the preferences and beliefs that sustain a system of limited
government.
In the system that Madison envisages, the danger is action and the
safeguard is stalemate, or, as he would have it, balance. Factious
interests are to be "broken," "controlled," and "balanced" against
each other to produce "stability."135
Interest groups enjoy multiple opportunities to block and stall government
action. A government decision like the requirement that a coal-burning power
plant be fitted with a scrubber represents a number of lost battles: the energy
industry unsuccessfully lobbied members of the Senate, the House, and the
President's administration, failed to persuade the civil servants in the
Environmental Protection Agency to craft a favorable implementing rule, and
lost in court. Because of the numerous opportunities for interest groups of all
types to participate directly in public decisionmaking, they can check and
constrain the exercise of public power. Interest group pluralism is part of, and
contributes to, a culture of democracy in which limited government is thought to
be the wisest system of government.
Corporatist Democracy
Germany is a classic corporatist democracy.136 The Basic Law establishes
a parliamentary system of government, meaning that the winner of elections to
the parliament (Bundestag) selects the head of the executive branch (Chancellor
and cabinet).137 The Basic Law follows Montesquieu's classic scheme in dividing
legislative and executive power between the parliament and the executive
branch, but the combination of parliamentary government and a strong party
system leads to the concentration of legislative and executive power in one set of
hands: the coalition of parties that won the elections.

REPUBLIC 606-18 (1969) (calling the Constitution "the end of classical politics" and arguing that the
Founders chose a liberal over a republican form of government).
135 See Pitkin, supra note__ at 195.
136 Norway, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Israel, the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan,
Finland, and Luxembourg are some of the democracies that are generally identified as corporatist.
See Lijphart, supra note__ at 177.
137 See Helmut Steinberger, Political Representation in Germany, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 121,
137-55 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993)
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The constitutional concentration of power in the executive branch enables
elected officials to filter carefully which private associations will influence
lawmaking.138 In drafting bills that touch upon issues such as pension reform
and unemployment benefits, bills that are sent later to parliament for debate and
voting, the Ministry of Economics regularly consults with peak organizations of
management and labor. The same goes for the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and
the Federation of German Consumer Organisations and the Ministry of the
Environment and environmental organizations. Moreover, advisory boards
composed of peak associations of business, labor, consumers, and environmental
groups have been established by a variety of sector-specific statutes and
ministerial orders.139
Private associations influence administrative decisionmaking too, but
again the law restricts access to government officials. The same constitutional
concentration of power in the executive branch that enables ministry civil
servants to consult selectively on proposed legislation also allows them to
consult selectively on administrative measures. Parliamentary laws also
guarantee certain associations, in specific policy areas, the right to participate in
rulemaking and other forms of administrative action that affect classes of firms
and individuals. For instance, environmental associations certified by federal
and state ministries of the environment can demand to be heard and to inspect
expert evidence in rulemaking conducted by nature conservation authorities.140
The law, however, does not create a right, applicable in all policy areas and
enjoyed by all individuals and associations, to be informed of rulemaking
proposals, voice objections, and receive a reply as in the American system.
Instead, German law draws a strict line between individual administrative acts
(Verwaltungsakt) and generally applicable rules.141 When an administrative
138 See generally Adams, supra note__ at 17 (stating that strong state capable of "organizing,
recognizing and identifying what groups are to be included in the policy and decision making
process" sets corporatist systems off from pluralist ones); Clive S. Thomas, Toward a Systematic
Understanding of Party-Group Relations in Liberal Democracies, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST
GROUPS 269, 275 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 2001) (describing the role of strong parties in serving as
gatekeeper to policymaking and importance of cultivating ties with party in order to influence
policy process).
139 For instance, the Consumer Advisory Council (Verbraucherbeirat) includes six consumer
associations, three government representatives, three academics, three union representatives, and
one member of the press. See Gunnar Trumbull, The Contested Consumer: The Politics of Product
Market Regulation in France and Germany 91 (Jan. 2004, unpublished manuscript on file with
author). In the environmental policy area, Carol Rose-Ackerman notes that the German
government routinely consults advisory committees. See CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1995).
140 See THEODORA TH. ZIAMOU, RULEMAKING, PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN THE
USA AND EUROPE 131 (2001).
141 MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 63 (2001). The
German Administrative Procedures Act does not cover rules. The only procedural requirements
are set down in the Basic Law and specific enabling laws. The Basic Law requires that rules be
published and that, in certain cases, they be presented to the Bundesrat and/or the Bundestag.
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decision is classified as an "act," the law guarantees individuals extensive hearing
rights before the administration. By contrast, when an administrative decision is
classified as a rule (Rechtsverordnungen or Verwaltungsvorschriften), the law
accords administration significant discretion and imposes minimal procedural
requirements.142
In the German system, intermediate associations are not limited to
influencing government policy decisions. The law confers upon certain
associations the power to set rules with ramifications not only for their members
but also society-at-large--rules which are backed by the state.143 For instance, a
single industry association, the Deutscher Normenausschuss (DIN), sets
technical product and process standards for all of Germany.144 An agreement
between DIN and the German government dating to 1975 recognizes DIN as the
standard-setting body for all Germany and as the national organization entitled
to sit in the various international standard-setting organizations in which
Germany takes part.145 By adopting DIN standards, firms come into compliance
with the safety requirements set down in consumer legislation.146 The agreement
between DIN and the German government imposes certain conditions: the
public interest must be protected, including public health, consumer safety, and
the environment; and consumers must be represented.147 Consumer
representation in DIN is assured through a five-member Consumer Council.148
Thus, public power comes with state-imposed responsibilities.

Moreover, enabling legislation frequently requires the government to lay rules before Parliament.
See generally, ZIAMOU, supra note__ at 15-18, 194-96.
142 Both Rechtsverordnungen and Verwaltungsvorschriften are determinations made by the
administration that legally bind an undefined number of persons. The difference is that while
Rechtsverordnungen bind individuals outside the administration, the equivalent of a rule or
regulation in American law, Verwaltungsvorschriften bind individuals within the administration.
The latter are primarily orders issued by senior officials and directed at junior civil servants, the
equivalent of certain types of informal rules in American law.
143 See Steinberger, Political Representation in Germany, supra note__at 123-24.
144 See Josef Falke, 3 RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER NORMUNG IN DEN EG-MITGLIEDSTAATEN: DEUTSCHLAND
22 (2000). In 1997, DIN counted 5,734 member firms.
145 See Harm Schepel & Josef Falke, 1 LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF
THE EC AND EFTA: COMPARATIVE REPORT 76 (2000).
146 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 77 (“DIN is given the task to support the Government by
creating, by means of the elaboration of standards, acknowledged rules of technology that enable
the reference to standards in legislation.”). For instance, under the Law on Safety of Equipment
(Gerätsicherheitsgesetz or GSG) equipment is considered safe and therefore liability-proof under the
following circumstances: "The producer or importer of technical equipment may only display or
circulate goods such that, in accordance with the generally recognized rules of technology as well
as the labor protection and accident avoidance regulations, the user or third party to its specified
application is protected against all kinds of risk to life and health, as specified by the manner of its
particular application." The DIN standards were quickly recognized by the courts as the "generally
recognized rules of technology." See Trumbull, supra note__ at 189-90.
147 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 76; Normenvertrag, art. 1.2 and annotations.
148 See Falke, supra note__at 183.
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As in the United States, associations of professionals such as lawyers,
accountants, pharmacists, physicians, and veterinarians are entrusted with
extensive rule-making and rule-enforcement powers over their members.149 In
Germany, however, this form of regulation also extends to businesses and trades.
By law, to run a restaurant or any other business, or to work as a painter, builder,
or in any of the other trades, one must be a member of a local chamber of
commerce (Industrie und Handelskammer for businesses and Handwerkskammer for
tradesmen). If, for instance, a painter is found by his local chamber to have
breached a service obligation, he can be expelled from the chamber and thus be
deprived of his livelihood.
The German collective bargaining regime also gives trade unions and
employers' organizations public power by putting them in the position of
deciding matters for workers and employers throughout the economy, not
simply their members. Collective bargaining agreements (Tarifverträge) are
governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreements Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz,
TVG).150 The Act regulates three components of all collective bargaining
agreements: entry into the agreement (Abschlußnormen); employment conditions
(Inhaltsnormen) such as wages, working time, and dismissals; and internal
obligations (Betriebsnormen) such as workplace bans on smoking and limits on
workplace surveillance of employees. 151 Thus, collective bargaining agreements
cover a wide array of matters related to the workplace, not simply wages and
working time, issues that in the United States are generally regulated by federal
and state administrative agencies. Moreover, while, as a general rule, a collective
bargaining agreement only binds those firms that signed the agreement through
the intermediary of their employers' association, the Act permits, under certain
circumstances, the Minister of Labour and Social Order to declare the agreement
generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) on all firms in the industry.152
Turning to the courts, there too German law gives certain intermediate
associations the right to influence public policymaking. Although not even
associations are allowed to bring pre-enforcement challenges to administrative
rules, as allowed under American law, certain intermediate associations are
empowered to enforce public interest statutes.153 This form of associational
149 This area of law is called Standesrecht. The codes of conduct issued by the free professions (Freie
Berufe) are known as Ordnungen der Berufsstände and violations of the codes are litigated before
special courts of honor (Ehrengerichte). See, e.g., Federal Act for Attorneys-At-Law §§ 43 et seq.
(Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung or BRAO).
150 See Basic Law, art. 9(3); Däubler, Tarifvertragsrecht, 3. AUFL. (1993); Löwisch & Rieble,
TARIFVERTRAGSGESETZT (2nd ed., 2004).
151 Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in the firm, regardless of whether they are
members of the trade union.
152 Collective Bargaining Agreements Act § 5.
153 Only when the rule is enforced against an individual or firm does the law recognize an
"administrative act" (Verwaltungsakt) that prejudices the rights of a party, which can then be
challenged in the courts by that party. At that point, the party can claim that the rule upon which
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lawsuit is known as a "class action" (Verbandsklage) and enables associations to
sue in their own right, without having to establish that an individual member
has legally recognized rights that have been injured.154 Verbandsklage have the
advantage over individual lawsuits that a judicial remedy can be awarded to the
entire class of individuals represented by the association, not simply the named
plaintiffs. Since the 1940s, local chambers of commerce (Industrie und
Handelskammer), competitors (Gewerbetreibende), and industry associations, whose
by-laws specify among their aims the pursuit of their members’s commercial
interests, have had the right to sue businesses guilty of anti-competitive practices
under the Unfair Competition Act.155 The same associations, plus trade unions,
also have the right to sue for infringements of various consumer protection
laws.156 Then, in the 1970s, a number of statutes empowered consumer and
environmental groups to bring lawsuits enforcing their terms. In 1976, consumer
associations with more than seventy-five members and accredited by the
Economics Ministry were allowed to sue to obtain injunctive relief under the law
on misleading advertising and unfair standard contracts.157 In 1979, Bremen
gave certain environmental organizations the right to sue for breaches of the
Bremen Environmental Protection Act and, in 1980, the Land of Hesse did the
same.158 Under the Federal Nature Conservation Act, passed in 2002,
environmental groups may sue to oppose public and private schemes with
environmental effects and to contest administrative waivers from the
requirements of the Act.159
In corporatist democracy, in contrast with pluralist democracy, the law
permits only certain associations take part in day-to-day lawmaking, rulemaking,
and enforcement, yet the law also confers greater public authority upon those
the enforcement action was based is illegal. Notice, however, that the range of parties that can
object to the rule is limited by the requirement of an act directed against a specific party, and the
arguments that can be used to oppose the rule do not include the procedural claims in American
administrative law, given the lack of a right to participate in administrative rulemaking.
154Absent such statutory authorization, associations are not allowed to sue on the behalf of their
members. A litigant must allege that the administrative act violated his or her own "subject rights."
See VwGO § 42.2.
155 Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act Against Unfair Competition) § 13.2.2; Köhler and
Piper, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 3rd ed., Munich 2002, § 13 note 11 (right to sue of
Gewerbetreibende), § 13 notes 17 & 20 (right to sue of industry associations).
156 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (Unfair Contract Terms
Act) § 22.3.1.2
157 See Unfair Contract Terms Act § 13.2.1.2; Trumbull, supra note__ at 78, 96. Since January 1, 2002,
the Unfair Contract Terms Act has been repealed and has been incorporated into a number of other
laws. The provisions on Verbandsklage are now section 3.1.1.2 of the Prohibitory Injunctions Act
(Gesetz über Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts--und anderen Verstöβen).
158 See Bremisches Naturschutzgesetz (Bremen Environmental Protection Act) §§43, 44; Hessisches
Naturschutzgesetz (Hessian Environmental Protection Act) § 36.
159 See Bundesnaturschutzgesetz § 61. Many of the consumer and environmental associations that
are given the right to sue also receive large amounts of direct government funding. This is the case
for the German Consumer Federation (Vzbv).
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same associations. What are the cultural norms and beliefs that underpin the
public law of associations in corporatist democracy? Industry, labor, the trades
and the professions, consumers, and environmentalists are believed to constitute
society.160 Membership in one of these groups is a matter of identity and
belonging. The fabric of the nation has many threads, some which are
ideological in nature and expressed through party affiliation and elections,
others which are related to the structure of the market and production of wealth,
others which are tied to family and community. In corporatism, when interest
groups are consulted or when they are allowed to govern, they are conceived as
acting in the public interest because, on certain matters, they are the public.
This ideology can be traced to different nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century theories of the state and society. To mention just a few of the
strands Philippe Schmitter identified in his now classic analysis of modern
corporatist practices: the romantic, organic thought of Friedrich Schlegel and
G.W. Friedrich Hegel; the Social Christian thought of Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl
von Vogelsang, Popes Leo XIII, and Pius XI; the fascist authoritarian thought of
Giuseppe Bottai and Francesco Vito.161 Some of the intellectual pedigree is
suspect, but then again, some of it is not. This form of interest accommodation
has co-existed happily with elections, legislative assemblies, and constitutional
courts for over fifty years now. The less fortunate ideological origins of the
public law of corporatist democracies should not prejudice contemporary
attitudes towards corporatist forms of interest representation.
A corollary of the idea of intermediate association as building block of the
nation is the necessity of distinguishing between associations which represent
and constitute broader identities and those which simply serve as temporary
conduits for the shifting preferences of individuals. In corporatist systems, not
all associations are created equal. Just because an organization has a charter and
members does not mean that it should be allowed to take part in policymaking
or set rules for its members, and by implication, all citizens who interact with its
members. The organization must satisfy certain conditions before it will be
recognized as representing broader social identities: recognition from those
whom it purports to represent, namely membership, recognition from other
associations, longevity, and so on.
The importance that corporatist democracies attach to public identities
other than nation does not mean that they denigrate the institutions of
citizenship--voting, parties, and elected representatives. Although it is certainly
true that corporatism has been used by authoritarian regimes--Mussolini in Italy,
Most political science studies of corporatism focus on peak associations of capital and labor and
their influence on labor market, social welfare, and economic policies. See Lijphart, supra note __ at
176. As new interests have emerged in areas such as consumer protection and the environment,
corporatist democracies have extended the old patterns of representation to the new forms of
interest and therefore I include these actors and policy areas as well.
161 See Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, supra note__ at 87.
160
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Franco in Spain, and a number of Latin American countries--corporatist interest
representation is also an important feature of established democracies such as
Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.162 Part of why public law permits
legislators and administrators to select the interest associations that will
influence policymaking is because elected representatives are trusted
institutional actors. Today, as the German Constitutional Court declared in the
case on the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, at the heart of the German
nation are elections and the Bundestag, the "representative of the whole
people."163 Because of the choice made in the Basic Law in favor of parliamentary
government, the elected officials that head the executive branch wield significant
powers. They are free from some of the checks of the American separation of
powers system, and rightly so in the eyes of the citizenry. As we shall soon see,
however, the executive branch in corporatist democracy is subject to greater
checks than in republican democracy, precisely because of the role of
intermediate associations in public decisionmaking.
A strong, elected executive branch that commands a professional
bureaucracy has a high capacity for action. Once a choice is made in a general
election in favor of a party and its platform, government faces fewer obstacles to
carrying out that choice in corporatist democracy than in the pluralist variety.
Legislation and implementing measures can be adopted with relative ease, given
the relationship between coalition parties, the government cabinet, and the
administration in drafting and shepherding the text through the government
process. Not as great a capacity for state action as in the case of French
republican democracy, however, because of the need to include and
accommodate important social and economic forces. Again, the ability to act
decisively in public affairs and pursue new policy initiatives is not simply a
matter of the institutional mechanics of corporatist democracy; it also informs the
expectations of the citizens who mobilize and organize within the world of
corporatist democracy. In this idea of democracy, once officials are elected to
office, they should be able to be carry out their policy agenda, checked only by
significant social forces, because those officials are considered representatives of
the people and, as such, able to make the right decisions for the nation.
Republican Democracy
In republican democracies, decisionmaking is dominated by the
institutions of voting, political parties, elected leaders, and specialized
administration, with little room for private associations. France is the
paradigmatic case, although even there interest and identity associations are

Id. at 89-90.
Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty, Case 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92 [1994] 1
CMLR 57, Oct. 12, 1993.
162
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becoming increasingly influential in day-to-day policymaking.164 Like Germany,
the origins of the French system are parliamentary. The Constitution of the Fifth
Republic, however, establishes a semi-presidential system: a directly elected
President appoints the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister must also enjoy
the support of the party or coalition of parties that wins the elections for
parliament (Assemblée Nationale).165 This might appear to create the possibility
of divided government, with the concomitant multiple points of access for
interest groups. Historical experience, however, has shown that during those
periods in which the offices of the Prime Minister and the President are held by
different parties, the Prime Minister dominates.166 The Prime Minister and his
cabinet work with an elite, professional administration to draft legislation.
Unlike Germany, the concentration of legislative power in the hands of the Prime
Minister, or the Prime Minister and President when they are both of the same
party, is used more to exclude interest groups, and less to screen them.167
Different ministries with historical ties to certain groups may call upon them to
comment on draft bills, yet the process is less systematic than in the German
system. The law also establishes a number of government bodies on which
employers' associations, professional associations, labor, farmers, consumers,
and other groups are represented and which are consulted in the lawmaking
process.168 The influence and pervasiveness of such advisory bodies in public
life, however, is less significant than in the German case.169
Rulemaking and other forms of policy implementation follow a similar
pattern. Drafting is a matter for the administration, with the exception of those
cases in which civil servants seek guidance from outside groups because such
groups are believed to have valuable experience or the issues are thought to be
politically sensitive. Some of the same advisory bodies that consult on draft
legislation also consult on important implementing rules (règlements). As in
164 Other such democracies are Greece and Malta. This classification is based on Schmidt and
Lijphart. Schmidt groups France and Greece together as "simple polities." See Schmidt, supra
note__ at 115. In Lijphart's analysis, Malta score high on interest group pluralism (indicating that
historical relations between state and society have not created incentives for interest groups to
organize into a small number of peak associations) and executive dominance (indicating that the
numerous interest groups do not have access to public decisionmakers because of the concentration
of power in the executive branch). See Lijphart, supra note__ at 138, 177. I have excluded common
law countries like the United Kingdom and Australia from this list because, even though they share
a number of features with France--a strong state that bars extensive interest group participation in
public decisionmaking,--they do not share the same republican ideology.
165 See FRENCH CONST., arts. 8 & 20; see generally Mark Kesselman, France, in EUROPEAN POLITICS IN
TRANSITION 127 (Mark Kesselman & Joel Krieger eds., 1987).
166 See Lijphart, supra note__ at 121-22.
167 See Andrew Appleton, France, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 45, 54 (Clive S. Thomas
ed., 2001) (describing ability of executive branch to control points of access of interest groups
because of elite status and professional ethos of civil service).
168 One prominent example is the Social and Economic Council, which, under the Constitution,
must be consulted on all economic and social legislation. See FRENCH CONST., arts. 70 & 71.
169 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46.

50

Civil Society and International Organizations
Germany and different from the United States, the law does not guarantee
associations outside advisory committees the right to be consulted. The law
draws a line between administrative decisions of general application (acte
réglementaire) and individualized determinations (acte individuel) and only
guarantees procedural rights before the administration in the latter case,
generally only for individuals named in the administrative proceeding.170
Private associations are also entrusted with regulatory powers, albeit less
often and with greater government participation than in Germany. The law
authorizes a single standard-setting organization, the Association Française de
Normalisation (AFNOR), to adopt industry standards, which are often
incorporated in health and safety and consumer protection laws and therefore
become legally binding.171 AFNOR is composed mainly of sector-specific
industry associations, but also has representation from trade unions, consumer
groups, and environmental organizations. In contrast to the German case, the
French government directly participates in the standard-setting work of AFNOR:
a government representative (commissaire du gouvernement) sits on AFNOR’s
governing board and can initiate new standards projects, comment on proposed
standards, and veto standards.172 Similar to Germany, the law requires firms to
join their local chambers of commerce (chambre de commerce), which exercise
regulatory and disciplinary powers over their members.173 Members of the
professions must join their national association (ordre), which is responsible for
drawing up professional codes of conduct (codes de déontologies) and enforcing the
terms of the code through their governing bodies (Conseil de l'ordre).174 Although
professional associations exercise this form of public power everywhere,
including the United States, their authority is more extensive in France: in the
case of doctors, dentist-surgeons, mid-wives, and pharmacists, their national
governing bodies decide disputes between their members and patients covered
under the state social insurance scheme.175
French law on the right of citizen associations to shape public policy
through the courts stands somewhere between American and German law. Like
the United States and unlike Germany, standing (intérêt à agir) to bring preenforcement challenges to administrative regulations is liberal.176 Associations
are normally permitted to sue on the behalf of the general interest (intérêt général
See JACQUELINE MORAND-DEVILLER, COURS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 317 (7th ed. 2001); MARCEAU
LONG, PROSPER WEIL, GUY BRAIBANT, PIERRE DELVOLVÉ & BRUNO GENVOIS, LES GRANDS ARRÊTS DE LA
JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 355, point 7 (14th ed. 2003).
171 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 71.
172 See id. at 72.
173 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46.
174 See JOËL MORET-BAILLY, LES DÉONTOLOGIES 99-126 (2001).
175 See id. at 184.
176 See MORAND-DEVILLER, supra note__ at 679. However, unlike citizens in Germany and the
United States, French citizens and their associations cannot bring constitutional challenges to
parliamentary laws. See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note __.
170
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or intérêt collectif) that they are charged with protecting under their by-laws.177
The grounds of review, however, are narrow since plaintiffs are not guaranteed
procedural rights in the administrative process and therefore can only challenge
the rule on the substance, not the procedure.178 Furthermore, the degree of
judicial interference with the government's findings on the substance is not
particularly extensive since the government is allowed significant discretion in
the rulemaking context.179
Again, with respect to associational enforcement of public interest
statutes, the French system also falls somewhere in between the American and
German systems. The law puts into place a number of cross-cutting
requirements that associations must satisfy before they can bring suit. Since
there are requirements, the litigation opportunities are not as significant as in the
American system; but since the requirements are cross-cutting, and not tied to
particular regulatory statutes, the litigation opportunities are greater than in the
German system. Traditionally, associations were allowed to sue to protect their
property rights and to represent the legal interests of their members--in common
law parlance, a claim sounding in tort, contract, or property--but not to vindicate
the broader public interest goals contained in laws. Only the public prosecutor
was recognized as the legitimate spokesman for the public interest. As one
standard text on the subject puts it:
Before, judges did not want to give to groups that were not
necessarily representative the power to represent the collectivity.
Generally speaking, they feared that civil actions, brought before
the courts by single associations, would encroach upon the
powers of the public prosecutor.180
Beginning in the early 1970s, judicial resistance to associational litigation
gave way to a more liberal approach and now associations are allowed to sue if
the interest being vindicated is consistent with their purposes under their bylaws (statuts) and as declared to the public authorities.181 For instance, in 1971, a
Holocaust remembrance group (Reseau de Souvenir) petitioned to join, as a civil
party, a criminal prosecution against Le Pen for publishing material favorable to
Hitler and the Nazis. Reseau de Souvenir was registered with the Ministry of
Interior as a public purpose association (association d'utilité publique) created to
protect the memories of those murdered in concentration camps. The Court of
Cassation decided in favor of Reseau de Souvenir, even though Reseau had
failed to prove that any single member suffered injury from Le Pen's publication

See id. at 679-80.
See id. at 684.
179 Id. at 261.
180 See CHARLES DEBBASCH & JACQUES BOURDON, LES ASSOCIATIONS 82 (8th ed. 2002) (my translation).
181 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ at 83
177
178
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and even though Reseau's injury was indistinguishable from that of its
members.182
A number of laws have also specifically recognized the right of
associations to litigate in the public interest: environmental organizations,
consumer organizations, animal rights groups, and civil liberties groups.183
These laws, however, all impose additional conditions beyond the courts'
requirement that associations be registered as public purpose associations whose
aims are related to the interests protected by the statute. For instance, consumer
groups must demonstrate at least one year of existence and "effective and public
activity" in defense of consumer interests. Furthermore, national consumer
associations must have at least 10,000 members while local associations must
have a "sufficient" number of members.184
Before concluding this overview of the French public law of associations,
one unusual feature should be noted, an anomaly which suggests a greater
suspicion of private associations in public life than in the American or German
cases. In the United States, associations are generally not required to register
with the public authorities unless they wish to claim tax-exempt status. In
Germany, voluntary associations (Vereine)-- among the most common are sports
clubs and singing clubs--are required to register with the local court
(Amtsgericht), which keeps what is called the Register of Associations
(Vereinsregister). Registration confers the association with legal personality,
enabling the association to enter into contracts, buy property, appear in court,
receive gifts and bequests, and engage in other legal relations under the Civil
Code. The requirements are minimal: associations must have at least seven
members and file articles of association that cover certain matters.185
The French registration scheme is more elaborate and demanding than in
either the American or German cases. In the 1800s, the Penal Code required that
all associations with over twenty members obtain authorization from the state or
face stiff criminal penalties.186 In 1901, the Penal Code provision was replaced
with a law, which still exists in a substantially modified form today. That law
establishes three types of associations, each of which is subject to a progressively
more stringent form of public supervision: non-declared, declared, and public
purpose associations. Any group of two or more persons can form a nondeclared association without registering with the authorities by adopting a set of
by-laws (statuts) to govern their activities. In the past, such associations were at a
disadvantage because they could not appear in court to challenge administrative
See Cour de cassation, 14 January 1971 (Association "le Réseau du Souvenir").
See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ , at 83-84.
184 Loi no. 88-14 du 5 janvier 1988 (Loi relative aux actions en justice des associations agréés de
consommateurs et à l'information des consommateurs), codified at Article R411-1, Code de la
Consommation.
185 See GERMAN CIVIL CODE, §§21, 55-79.
186 See GILLES LEBRETON, LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUE ET DROIT DE L'HOMME 495 (5th ed. 2001).
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acts or enter into contracts; today, non-declared associations generally enjoy
these basic rights before the courts. The second type--declared associations--can
hold property, enter into contracts, and litigate in their own name. Such
associations must file certain information with the local prefect (préfet) 187 and
must maintain a special register in which they note all significant acts of the
association, to be presented on demand to the authorities.188
We have already seen the third type of association--public purpose
associations--in the discussion of associational litigation. These citizen
associations are significantly different from the previous two, both in the
activities they can undertake and the degree of state supervision they undergo.189
Public purpose associations are entitled to receive donations and bequests and
may, depending on whether the law sets down additional requirements, bring
the public interest litigation described earlier. To qualify, an association is
required to file an application with the Ministry of Interior. The decision to grant
the application is based on a number of criteria: the association pursues the
general interest (intérêt général); its the scope of action extends beyond the purely
local; it has a significant number of members; it has sufficient resources; and it
has existed for at least three years.190 Once an association is approved, it must
keep its books and premises open for inspection and it must file annual reports
with the authorities.191
The common wisdom among legal scholars is that the original statutory
scheme was driven by the fear of "the triumph of particular interests over the
general interest" and the desire to prevent private associations from competing
with the state.192 The intent was to curb the accumulation of property and power
outside of the state. French politics has long since lost this Rousseau-tinted
hostility towards citizen associations, but the fact of state regulation of such
associations remains--regulation that does not exist in the United States or
Germany.
What, then, are the understandings, preferences, and beliefs that sustain
the republican system of citizen associations in democratic decisionmaking? In
republican democracy, the law, through liberal rights of free expression and
association, creates an ample public sphere in which citizens can join together
and debate the issues of the day. The law, however, does not afford citizen
groups the same opportunities to influence legislators and bureaucrats as in
pluralism and corporatism, nor does the law afford the same opportunities to

The prefect is the public official charged with representing the state and administering the law at
the local level. See AGATHE VAN LANG, GENEVIÈVE GONDOUIN & VÉRONIQUE INSERGUET-BRISSET,
DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 239 (3d ed. 2002).
188 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ at 111.
189 See LEBRETON, supra note__ at 502.
190 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ at 40.
191 See id. at 111-12.
192 See id. at 14-17.
187
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influence judges as in pluralism. That is because, unlike Germany, interest
associations are believed to pursue narrow and selfish aims. 193 And, unlike the
United States, the response to this understanding of interest is to exclude private
associations from lawmaking and administration and to screen them before they
can appear in court. The response is not, as in the United States, to open the
doors of government to all interests so that they can check and balance one
another. In republican democracy, no matter how many different associations
and interests are called to participate in politics, they are not believed capable of
transcending their particularities and constituting the people.
The French idea of democracy can be traced to the political theory of
Rousseau as popularized in the Jacobean phase of the French Revolution.
According to this version of Rousseau, citizens owed their primary allegiance to
the Republic and had to ratify, directly, all laws of the Republic. All other
loyalties based on the Church, status and trade were considered illegitimate.194
Obviously, French democracy has changed considerably since then. Yet, through
public law and political thought, some of the basic principles have survived.195
Citizens do not wish to participate in politics through the intermediary of
interest groups and interest group elites to the same extent as their pluralist
cousins, nor do they believe that a political community in which such interest
politics prevail is a viable one, not to speak of a good one.
The rejection of interest groups in the daily government activities of
lawmaking, administration, and judging is related to the importance attached to
the democratic institutions of voting, parties, and elected officials. At the center
of the French legal system is not the Constitution nor the decisions of the
Constitutional Court, but la loi--parliamentary statutes—because all citizens are
believed to be able to participate in their making, either personally or through
their elected representatives.196 As Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man says:
The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have
the right to contribute personally or through their
representatives to their making.

PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND
FRANCE 165 (1986).
194 See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
132, 149 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989); Michael A. Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION
AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 211, 211 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989).
195 See, e.g., RENÉ CAPITANT, DÉMOCRATIE ET PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE 7-36 (1971) (linking
contemporary institutions of French representative democracy to Rousseau and contrasting with
the democratic tradition of Locke).
196 See Etienne Picard, Delegation of Legislative Power, in FRENCH PUBLIC LAW, DELEGATED LEGISLATION
AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC 67, 74-81 (Mads Andenas & Alexander Türk eds., 2000).
193
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Glorification of la loi, like suspicion of interest groups, bears the heavy imprint of
the French Revolution and the active citizenship ideal. It certainly does not
represent contemporary French democratic theory. Yet this understanding still
informs the types of activities that French citizens value in public life—voting
rather than lobbying and other forms of interest group activity. Moreover, the
primacy of voting and parliamentary assemblies in French political thought is
linked to beliefs about the dangerous consequences of downgrading elections to
one among many other of political activity, of the same importance as
membership in interest associations.
Finally, even more so than corporatist democracy, French citizens inhabit
a political world in which the state has a high capacity for action. The ideology
of la loi is combined today with a strong executive branch characteristic of
parliamentary systems and a centralized bureaucracy. In France, the
government is even more powerful than in Germany, where important social
and economic interests can delay or stop public policy initiatives, and where the
Constitutional Court and federalism impose considerable constraints. Once the
French Prime Minister and President (if of the same party) are elected into office,
they can carry out their mandate rapidly, free from some of institutional checks
that characterize the American and French systems.
My account of republican democracy, even more so than of pluralist and
corporatist democracy, is highly stylized. As the French law of citizen
associations illustrates, even the constitutional system that typifies republicanism
today departs dramatically from the ideal type and allows private associations to
influence significantly the daily workings of government. Yet that does not
mean that the different law and culture of democracy has been eradicated. As
the changing French law of associational standing demonstrates, even though a
republican democracy might come to permit more associational participation in
law enforcement, it does so through a uniquely republican set of legal practices:
the interest that was considered particular is rendered general through the
intervention of the state and the recognition that the association serves the
general interest.
At the risk of slipping into caricature, the differences that separate
contemporary democracies on the appropriate role for private associations in
public life can be summarized as follows. When an American gazes across the
Atlantic she sees capture by special interests in Germany, authoritarianism in
France. When a German or Frenchman looks in the direction of her American
cousins, she sees anarchy in which, ultimately, the most powerful economic
interests prevail.
The Role for Civil Society in Global Democracy
It is time to return to the questions from the beginning of the Article.
Should World Bank executive directors and civil servants be required to solicit

56

Civil Society and International Organizations
the reaction of civil society before they approve loans? Should environmental
groups and others be called upon to participate in the work of the WTO's
Committee on Trade and the Environment? How should the Constitutional
Treaty provision on civil society consultation in the European Union be
interpreted? In sum, what should be the role of civil society in a democratic
system of global governance?
The comparative law of democracy shows that each of these questions
can be answered in at least one of three ways: all, some, or none of the
associations between the state and the market should be entitled to participate in
the institutions of global governance. Appreciation and tolerance of legitimate
differences on the civil society question and self-awareness of the inevitable bias
that comes from being a citizen of one of the many cultures of democracy, is the
first lesson to draw from this analysis. But for those wrestling with the issue in
the global arena, for whom this conclusion is not particularly satisfying, we can
go one step further.
Following the lead of critical theory, we might predict that American
governmental and non-governmental actors will foist their pluralist model on
institutions of global governance, using their power and resources as citizens of
the hegemon.197 Indeed, the recent history of international organizations contains
some evidence of such attempts at transforming the law in America's image. In
the negotiations on Chinese accession to the WTO, the United States demanded,
successfully, that China introduce domestic administrative law reforms that
would approximate the participation rights contained in the U.S. Administrative
Procedure Act.198 When the European Commission circulated a proposed set of
guidelines on civil society consultation, the U.S. government replied that the
guidelines should apply, without exception, to all Commission initiatives, should
never be used to favor certain groups over others, and should be enforceable in
the courts. In other words, the U.S. government replied that the European
Union, like China, should adopt the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act.199 The
European Commission, unlike China, said "no."

See generally David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 415 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (describing critical approach
to public international law).
198 See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Part I.2 (C) (“Transparency”),
WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001.
199 See Communication from the Commission, Consultation Document: Towards a reinforced
culture of consultation and dialogue--Proposal for general principles and minimum standards for
consultation of interested parties by the Commission, June 5, 2002, COM (2002) 277 final;
Comments of the United States Government on the European Commission's Better Regulation
Package at 2-9 (2002), available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/consultation/index_en.htm; Communication
from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue--Proposal for
general principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the
Commission, Dec. 11, 2002, COM(2002) 704 final, at 8-14.
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From a critical perspective, a successful bid to transpose American-style
pluralist participation to the international realm would constitute an act of
exclusion. Of whom? First, the same individuals and groups that are
disadvantaged by pluralist institutions in domestic, American politics. But
understanding precisely which groups are systematically advantaged and
disadvantaged by the configuration of rights and procedures in a pluralist order
is not a simple task. Take one piece of the American pluralism, notice and
comment rulemaking. Mark Seidenfeld and Cass Sunstein separately argue that
American rulemaking furthers the ideals of deliberative democracy, that is,
reasoned public deliberation among the citizens, bureaucrats, and judges
involved in rulemaking.200 According to Seidenfeld and Sunstein, affected
citizens put forward their concerns, administrators listen and respond based on
the universalist grounds of good scientific evidence and the enabling statute's
overall policy goals, and the courts oversee the entire process to ensure that the
bureaucrats are deciding based on public reasons. This procedure stops citizens
from putting forward narrow, self-interested arguments and stops bureaucrats
from striking deals that satisfy the most powerful participants in the process.
Not so, argues Thomas McGarity. American rulemaking in his view
"works to the advantage of powerful entrenched economic interests."201 Why is
this the case? Regulated business is more likely to take part in rulemaking in the
first place.202 The interest of economic actors is to delay the promulgation of
rules since the later they must comply, the less they must spend. Moreover,
trade associations and firms have the resources necessary to participate
effectively, resources which are generally lacking in the public interest sector.
Lastly, the American judges that enforce such procedural rights on judicial
review impose the demanding standard of "comprehensive analytical
rationality." Regulators can rarely meet this standard because they operate in the

200 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 60-64 (1985);
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271
(1986); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1560 (1992); Steve P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 156-58
201 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 531 (1997). McGarity accepts public participation in rulemaking. See
Thomas O. McGarity, Public Participation in Risk Regulation, 1 RISK: ISSUES HEALTH & SAFETY 103, 112
(1990). However, it appears that he would do away with cost-benefit analysis and most judicial
review, including judicial review of an agency's fulfillment of the procedural requirements of
rulemaking.
202 A number of studies document the greater presence of trade associations and regulated firms as
compared to consumer groups and environmental protection groups in rulemaking. See Steven P.
Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 127- 33
(1998); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. ORG. 180,
186 (1999) ("formalized procedures advantage organized interests, which makes possible the
frequent observation that regulated firm sometimes capture regulatory agencies").

58

Civil Society and International Organizations
real world of scientific uncertainty, unquantifiable benefits, and practical and
political difficulties in pursuing certain policy alternatives.
Even supposing Sunstein, Seidenfeld, and McGarity were able to agree on
whether American pluralist rulemaking systematically favored certain interests
over others, their assessment might vary over time. For instance, the low
capacity for state action in pluralist systems might make redistributive measures
more difficult to enact than elsewhere, yet once in place, that very same inability
to act might make it more difficult to dismantle the welfare state.203 To return to
the initial point, understanding the injustice caused by the different laws of
democracy is a formidable endeavor.
Easier to assess is the exclusion of other cultures of democracy that would
result from the adoption of a pluralist model. The choice of pluralism would
inevitably exclude corporatism and republicanism. A number of political
scientists have explored this phenomenon in the context of the European Union,
where a common set of European institutions and laws are superimposed on
different national cultures of democracy. Predictably, the political scientists
prefer the term "fit" to "repression" but the idea is quite similar. They argue that
the better the fit between the structure of European governance and the national
political system, the smaller the transformation in domestic processes; vice versa,
the poorer the fit, the greater the transformation.204 Yet even the more significant
changes that have occurred in the "misfit" countries do not appear to be
particularly troubling. Countries such as France have witnessed a decline in
executive branch power, an increase in the powers of the judiciary, and an
expansion of the prerogatives of regional government in relation to central
government.205 One set of constitutional practices is replaced with another set,
both of which have good and bad consequences for democratic ideals.
Political scientists have also observed that government and private actors
from "misfit" countries must adapt more extensively than actors from "fit"
countries to operate effectively in the different institutional environment of
Brussels. Interest participation is one area in which European procedures and
institutions differ from national democratic practices. With the many
See Evelyne Huber & John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and
Policies, in GLOBAL MARKETS 82 (2001) (arguing that political systems with multiple veto points for
interest groups are less likely to construct strong welfare states); Duane Swank, Political Institutions
and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on Social Policy Change in Developed
Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE (Paul Pierson ed., 2001) (arguing that such
political systems are less likely to give rise to heavily redistributive welfare states but also make it
more difficult to unravel the welfare state once in place).
204 See Schmidt, Europeanization of National Democracies, supra note__ at 113; Adrienne Héritier &
Christoph Knill, Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison, in DIFFERENTIAL EUROPE:
NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR NATIONAL POLICY-MAKING 257 (Adrienne Héritier et al.
eds., 2001); Christoph Knill, THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS: PATTERNS OF
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE 46-50 (2001).
205 See Schmidt, Europeanization of National Democracies, supra note__at 118.
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opportunities it affords for interest group participation, the European Union is a
"quasi-pluralist" polity.206 Vivien Schmidt argues that because French organized
interests come from a republican tradition in which they have few opportunities
to influence policymaking, they have had difficulties mobilizing and pressing
their agendas in Brussels.207 By contrast, German organized interests have
significant experience with this form of democracy, coming from a corporatist
system in which intermediate associations regularly shape public policy, and
therefore they have been quite successful in Brussels. From an equity
perspective, this is troubling.
Yet it appears that even this well-established form of exclusion caused by
adopting one model of democracy over the others is quickly overcome.
According to Schmidt, national actors have not wasted much time in adapting to
the new realities of European politics; today, even French organized interests are
quite adept at getting their way in Brussels.208 Moreover, as was stressed at the
outset of the discussion of the different models of associational participation,
none of them is monolithic even within the country believed to exemplify the
model; therefore, in certain policy areas, domestic actors may very well be
familiar with the alternative mode of democracy. There is an even more basic
reason for not taking this form of exclusion too seriously: when a regional or
global political space emerges and a single set of constitutional rules must be
devised, such rules will inevitably depart more radically from some national
constitutional practices than others. If the World Bank or the WTO were to resist
the pressure to Americanize and were to decide that civil society participation
should be organized along the lines of German corporatism, a culture would still
be excluded, just a different one. International organizations and global regimes
are indispensable, but they also have costs.
How are national officials and international bureaucrats to make a
principled choice among the different models? Recall that, in the discussion of
the public law of interest accommodation, the values and beliefs sustaining that
public law were identified. While it may very well be impossible to say whether
these popular theories of democracy are right or wrong when they operate in the
native soil of a national community, we can inquire whether their beliefs find
support in the empirics of emerging global communities.
Citizens in pluralist democracies value competition among multiple
interests and identities; they believe that public welfare can emerge from this
form of political engagement. In the global realm, however, it appears that
commercial interests mobilize more than other types of interests and that citizens
of northern countries band together in associations more than their counterparts
in southern countries. Many observers believe that multinational corporations
I would place the emphasis on "quasi" since considerably more effort is made to screen and
select interest associations than in American pluralism.
207 See Schmidt, Europeanization of National Democracies, supra note__ at 120.
208 Id. at 120.
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and business lobbies, with their superior financial resources, are better organized
than public interest groups.209 Similarly, northern NGOs significantly outnumber
southern NGOs.210 To speak with the language and metaphors of the pluralist
tradition, special interest not pluralist competition is the reality of global politics;
international institutions would be captured by corporate interests and public
interests from the North. In the new terrain of global governance, adopting the
public law of pluralism would fall short of the aspirations of that law.
Citizens in republican democracies believe that directly elected officials
should be at the center of public life, with little interference from private
associations or other institutional actors. Research on regional and global
regimes, however, has shown that when power is transferred to the global realm,
national voters, parties, parliaments, and even leaders of executive branches, lose
control.211 Regulators and politicians who make decisions in institutions of
global governance do so largely free of party and parliamentary oversight.
Under these conditions, republican laws and institutions that would permit
global policymakers to exclude non-state actors could not hope to achieve the
ideals of representative democracy that underpin such constitutions.
See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective
Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 982 (expressing concern that freely
allowing amicus briefs before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body will work to the advantage of
“well-funded industry or corporate groups”); Riva Krut, Globalization and Civil Society: NGO
Influence in International Decision-making, United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development Discussion Paper No. 83, text at nn. 60-62 (Geneva, April 1997); Mattner, supra note__
at 137-39 (noting the disproportionate influence of commercial lobbies in the WTO).
210 See Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development, supra note__ at 954 (noting that,
over the course of the WTO’s first four Ministerial meetings, 1195 of the 1533 NGOs attending were
from North America or Europe and only 70 were from Latin America or Africa); Krut,
Globalization and Civil Society, supra note__text at nn. 40-44; Mattner, supra note__ at 137-39
(noting the disproportionate influence of northern NGOs in the WTO); Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle At The WTO, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 87, 105 (arguing that a
system of amicus briefs in WTO dispute resolution proceedings will work to the advantage of
northern NGOs and the cause of “ecoimperialism”).
211 See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining Accountability for Global Governance, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 386, 388, 397 (Miles
Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003) (stating that electoral accountability in international
governance is weak because of long chain of delegation running from national voting publics to
heads of state and international organizations); Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or:
Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L. J. 463 (1996) (lamenting
lack of democratic control of informal transnational networks); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 369 (2001) (noting lack
of national executive branch control over transnational regulatory networks); Edward T. Swaine,
The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Colum L. Rev. 1492, 1563-65 (noting that
delegations to international institutions are further removed from national voters than delegations
to national administrative agencies). See also CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 79-92 (2002) (analyzing lack of national parliamentary control over EU decisionmaking);
Juliet Lodge, The European Parliament, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? (Svein S.
Anderson & Kjell A. Eliassen eds., 1996) (blaming national executives for intentionally
marginalizing national parliaments in EU policymaking).
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Corporatist democracy's balance between associationalism and elected
officials is better-suited to the global politics of today. Given the separation
between public officials in the global sphere and voters and elected politicians in
the national realm, such officials should be required to solicit the views of
associations. The case for interest representation in international organizations
would hold even in the face of a cosmopolitan Global People's Assembly. A
directly elected assembly, or a series of such assemblies in specific international
regimes, would be unlikely to satisfy current understandings of democratic
representation. A global assembly's world-wide scale, together with the practical
limits on the assembly's size, would mean that each legislator would represent
an enormous constituency. Such a distance between voters, their representatives,
and the assembly's collective output would test severely the contemporary
concept of representative democracy. Therefore, even a cosmopolitan
international order--one that served global citizens, not states--would need to
supplement the public law of French-style republican democracy with other
institutions. One possibility would be an elaborate, federalist system of local,
national, regional, and global assemblies with carefully allocated powers.
Another is the one explored in this Article--representation of citizens based not
on territory, but on common interests and identities.
Representation of interest should follow a corporatist, not pluralist, mold.
Unlike pluralist democracies, resources are so unevenly distributed in global
politics that we cannot assume all will be able to mobilize and to compete,
thereby generating the public good. As in the corporatist tradition, international
officials should seek to understand which associations represent significant social
and economic forces and to take their views into account. Public officials should
take pains to ensure balance among those associations that can legitimately claim
to represent large number of citizens, united by common social and economic
interests. Just because certain businesses, in some sectors of the economy, can
command the profits necessary to organize at the international level, does not
signify that they should have a special voice in global governance. The same is
true for professional advocacy groups that have the skills necessary to apply for
foundation funding but do not have large memberships or that come from
wealthy northern countries. Not to say that such interest groups should be
excluded from international policymaking. Their views, however, should be
moderated by those of other groups that do not have the resources to attend
international treaty negotiations, lobby international regulatory committees, and
file briefs before international tribunals.
What shape might this form of mediated civil society participation take?
As the reader will recall, the corporatist model--illustrated by the German
system--enables intermediate associations to participate in policymaking through
a number of procedures. Committees of associational representatives are
consulted on legislative and administrative measures; industry and professional
associations are entrusted with regulatory functions, subject to requirements of
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representation of outside groups and supervision by the courts; certain
associations are allowed to enforce public interest statutes by bringing lawsuits.
Let us conduct a thought experiment. Transpose one piece of the corporatist
model to one international organization: sector-specific advisory committees of
associational representatives at the WTO. Such committees could be created in
areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, consumer policy, the environment, and
development. One example has been suggested by Dan Esty--an advisory
committee of environmental and business interests that sits alongside the
intergovernmental Committee on Trade and the Environment. These civil
society committees would be consulted on revisions to the WTO Agreements in
WTO Ministerials and on interpretations of those agreements issued by the
WTO's specialized intergovernmental committees. Civil society committees
would have a right to meet with government officials about proposals, to submit
written papers on proposals, and to publish their reactions to the policies
ultimately adopted; they would not have veto power or the power to vote.
Government officials could reject their views but, to the extent that such views
were well-substantiated, at the peril of public opprobium.
Imagining this form of corporatist interest representation at the global
level is difficult for a number of reasons, some of which are unique to an
international setting, others of which are instrinsic to the corporatist model
wherever it operates. The most significant conceptual hurdle in making the
transition from the domestic to the international realm is selecting the
associations that would be entitled to representation. How would the
associations sitting on WTO advisory committees be chosen? If governments
were allowed to select from their national associations, then the moral premise of
liberalism that has guided this entire analysis would suffer. Many societies do
not recognize liberalism's limits on state authority, limits that are vital to the
existence of civil society. For this reason, such societies are less likely to have
interest associations. Moreover, illiberal governments are likely to select
associations that represent state interests, not independent social and economic
interests. But neither is the solution to give the task to an official in the WTO
secretariat. The whole point of corporatist interest representation is to enable
significant social and economic forces to take part in public decisionmaking.
What is "significant" cannot be decided by a civil servant sitting in Geneva,
removed from the complicated social realities of different parts of the world.
One provisional solution would be for regional organizations--the
African Union, Organization of American States, Association of South East Asian
Nations, and others--to appoint the civil society associations entitled to send
representatives to WTO advisory committees. Most regions of the world contain
a number of different regimes, some more liberal than others; by requiring a
group of states to come to agreement, the difficulty of creating liberal global
governance out of illiberal states is reduced somewhat. Moreover, this
arrangement has the advantage of giving the choice to government officials
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familiar with the local cultures to be represented. Politicians and bureaucrats at
the regional level should have a better understanding of their social and
economic realities than civil servants in international bureaucracies. Tasking
regional organizations with the choice of associations would also have a practical
advantage. Each region could have the right to name four associations to each
sector-specific committee. This committee structure, with its natural limit on
membership numbers, would render the deliberations of WTO advisory
committees far more manageable than if members were chosen by individual
states.
Another set of challenges is related to the defects of corporatism
domestically and the importance of attempting to avoid such defects at the
international level. Again, at the heart of the matter is the selection of
associations. At any historical moment, it might be clear which social forces have
mobilized successfully in democratic politics and hence are entitled to influence
directly public policy. But societies change. The special rights fairly granted to
certain groups and their associations at one point in time, might become unjust
privileges at a future point in time. As group members become preoccupied
with new interests and identities and defect to other organizations, corporatist
systems of interest representation can become obsolete. One oft-cited example
of this phenomenon is the continuing prominence of blue collar unions in
European politics notwithstanding their dwindling membership figures.
Furthemore, any system that allows private associations to participate in
policymaking, even a pluralist one, will lend state resources to those associations
that succeed in advancing their goals through the process. In corporatist systems
this dynamic is more apparent than in pluralist ones--although not necessarily
more prevalent--because certain groups are empowered by law to contribute to
policymaking. To avoid these defects, corporatist procedures at the international
level should be designed to facilitate adaptation and flexibility. Every five to ten
years, on a staggered basis, regional organizations would be asked to review
their appointment of associations to WTO advisory committees. And to combat
the danger of empowering, unfairly, one set of social actors over another set,
regional organizations could be required to replace at least one out of their four
associations during their periodic reviews.
This thought experiment can also incorporate some of the policy
implications of the political philosophy of civil society. The goal of cosmopolitan
mobilization should be taken into account in designing WTO advisory
committees; trasnational associations should be represented too. The WTO
secretariat could be charged with the selection task. Its civil servants are
particularly well-placed to determine which associations are genuinely
transnational in their activities and likely, therefore, to promote civic
consciousness across national borders. Certain criteria could guide the
appointments process: for instance, transnational associations that count 50,000
members in over thirty countries. Finally, in line with corporatist systems
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nationally, public funding for needy associations should be made available by
the WTO and should be administered by the WTO secretariat. The purpose of
designing a corporatist committee system is to guarantee balance in a global
community in which interest group activity appears imbalanced. Ensuring that
the members of such a committee system have the material resources necessary
to participate effectively in committee work is part and parcel of creating the
conditions for equal voice.
The argument for mediating the influence of interest associations, based
on the realities of transnational associational life and representative democracy,
also holds true in the European Union. Today the associational landscape of
Brussels is more densely populated than before and a directly elected legislative
assembly--the European Parliament--now exercises significant lawmaking and
oversight responsibilities. Nevertheless, the European political space continues
to display some of same characteristics as purely international regimes. Small,
sector-specific industry associations and multinationals are better organized than
nationwide employer associations, consumers groups, and human rights
organizations.212 The European Parliament is directly elected but not directly
accountable. Citizens largely ignore the activities of their European
parliamentarians; national politics and political identities still take precedence
over the nascent pan-European public sphere.213
National governments and the European Commission already play a
significant role in deciding which associations should participate directly in
policymaking.214 National governments choose the producer groups, labor
unions, farmer organizations, and consumer associations that sit on the
Economic and Social Committee. The Commission selects the pan-European
federations that sit on numerous issue-specific advisory committees. This
tradition of interest mediation should inform the Principle of Participatory
Democracy guaranteed under Article I-47 of the Constitutional Treaty. European
Courts should be wary of interpreting Article I-47 as a legal right to comment on
See Alan Cawson, Big Firms as Political Actors: Corporate Power and the Governance of the European
Consumer Electronics Industry, in PARTICIPATION AND POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 185
(Helen Wallace & Alasdair R. Young eds., 1997) (arguing that small clusters of multinationals more
powerful than employers’ associations); Maria Green Cowles, The Transatlantic Business Dialogue
and Domestic Business-Government Relations, in TRANSFORMING EUROPE: EUROPEANIZATION AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE (Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso & Thomas Risse eds., 2001) (describing
advantages of single European companies over European and national employers associations in
dealings with European Commission); CARLO RUZZA, EUROPE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 5-7 (2004)
(describing traditional bias toward business interests but growing importance today of public
interest associations); Alasdair R. Young, Consumption Without Representation? Consumers in the
Single Market, in PARTICIPATION AND POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 206 (Helen Wallace &
Alasdair R. Young eds., 1997) (describing organizational difficulties of European consumer
movement).
213 See JUDGE & EARNSHAW, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT supra note__ at 76, 112-13.
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212

65

Civil Society and International Organizations
public policy measures, available to all citizens and their associations and
enforceable in the courts. This would come close to the law of pluralist
democracy and may not be suited to the realities of European governance.
Rather, to further the cosmopolitan ideal, associations that have numerous
members scattered throughout Europe and that seek to encourage debate on
European political issues should play an important policymaking role.
Moreover, the organizations that national governments deem important in
public life because of their long-standing histories and membership figures-some of which already sit on the Economic and Social Committee--should be
given special consideration in European legislative and administrative processes.
In designing civil society participation, global policymakers should bear
in mind that just as patterns of interest representation vary significantly within
national systems of government, different forms of accommodation might be
appropriate across international organizations or international policy areas. For
instance, certain issues might provoke such extensive global mobilization that
pluralist institutions are appropriate. Or national legislatures and executive
branches might track certain forms of global governance so carefully that it
might be proper to limit the role of civil society, as in the republican model. Or
the public's desire for swift and decisive government action might be such that
civil society participation should be restricted.
Conclusion
For global politics to become democratic politics, it is critical that citizens
throughout the world debate and band together on the issues being decided in
the many sites of global governance. Yet that basic liberal intuition does not
necessarily support the conclusion that the associations through which citizens
mobilize should participate in policymaking. This Article demonstrates that
liberal theories of civil society advance the cause of specific types of associations:
local associations with grassroots followings in the social capital and
communitarian schools of thought and transnational membership associations
for cosmopolitans. Ongoing reform efforts in organizations like the World Bank
and the WTO should pay special attention to these forms of civil society.
Architects of international organizations can also draw inspiration from
national experiences with democracy. Democratic societies have devised at least
three ways of accommodating interest and identity groups in public life:
pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism. Each embodies a specific set of
values and beliefs about public life. Proving these popular theories of democracy
right or wrong in their native soil is not feasible. It is possible, however, to
discern whether their belief systems have any purchase on the contemporary
realities of politics in the international realm. In a global world of poorly
organized interests and ineffective electoral politics, the premises of neither the
pluralist nor the republican models are satisfied. The laws and institutions of
pluralist and republican democracy, when transposed to this new global terrain,
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would fall short of the ideals and aspirations of those political communities. The
public law of corporatist democracy is a good alternative. Corporatist
democracy's belief that only certain intermediate associations are legitimate
participants in policymaking, alongside elected officials and civil servants, is
better-suited to some of the realities of contemporary global politics.

67

